龙之谷手游怎么兑换礼包码:5G生態系統:對美國國防部的風險與機遇(全文翻譯)

來源:國防創新委員會 時間:2019-05-28 創業創新
中國計劃部署第一個廣泛使用的5G網絡,其首批Sub-6網絡服務將于2020年投入使用。先發優勢可能會推動智能手機和電信設備供應商以及國內半導體和系統供應商的市場大幅增長。

龙之谷手游新区2019 www.upgxy.icu   發布機構:國防創新委員會

  發布日期:2019年4月

  翻譯:中國信通院5G創新研究中心

  概要

  “5G”指的是即將到來的第五代無線網絡和技術,它相比第四代(4G和4G LTE)網絡在數據傳輸速度、容量和延遲(數據傳輸延遲)方面都有較大的飛躍。5G所帶來一系列新技術,將會在從無人駕駛汽車到智能城市、從虛擬現實到作戰網絡等各領域重新建立公眾及個人的業務標準。無線時代的歷史變遷表明,該領域內先行者國家將獲得數十億美元的收益,同時還將創造大量就業崗位,并在技術創新方面處于領先地位。同時先行者國家還會制定標準和規范,其他國家將不得不采用這些標準和規范。相反地,在以前的無線迭代轉變中落后的國家因為不得不采用領先國家的標準、技術和架構,從而喪失了新一代無線技術的開發能力和市場潛力。

  2010年初,AT&T和Verizon利用在2008年競標中贏得的700兆赫(MHz)頻譜迅速在全美部署LTE。在這一部署的基礎上,美國成為(繼芬蘭之后)第一個擁有LTE綜合網絡的國家,LTE網絡的性能大約是當時3G網絡的10倍。這種性能上的進步推動了智能手機的迅速普及,這種新型手機不僅可以傳輸更多內容,而且速度更快。Apple、Google、Facebook、Amazon、Netflix等無數美國公司都針對這一頻譜開發了新應用程序和服務。隨著LTE技術在其他國家部署,相應的手機和應用程序也得以在全球推廣。這一舉措助力美國取得無線和互聯網服務領域的全球主導地位,并創造了一個由美國領導的無線生態系統,美國國防部和世界其他地區近十年都在使用這一系統。

  自LTE推出以來,原來的無線競爭格局發生了變化。中國電信設備巨頭華為的全球營收從2009年的約280億美元增至2018年的1070億美元,而愛立信、諾基亞等這些傳統市場領軍企業同期營收均有所下降?;?、中興通訊、小米、VIVO和OPPO等中國手機廠商在全球市場份額迅速增長,盡管在美國市場的銷量還比較小,但在使用率和影響力方面仍在迅速增長。2009年,收入排名前十的互聯網公司都是美國公司。如今,在前十名中中國企業占了四個席位。這種趨勢仍在繼續,如果中國繼續領先,以5G為代表的未來網絡有可能進一步向中國傾斜。

  從4G向5G的轉變將極大地影響全球通信網絡的未來,并從根本上改變美國國防部運作的環境。雖然國防部感受到5G帶來的影響,但其部署工作仍由美國商業部門推動。本文對5G的商業環境和國防部運作環境進行了深入研究,以全面了解利益相關者的態度和5G的未來。

  5G具備從網絡互聯到戰場的戰術邊緣增強國防部決策和戰略能力的能力。5G將增強國防部多個系統連接到更廣泛網絡的能力,實現實時共享信息,改善跨服務、地理和領域的通信水平,同時開發戰場的通用圖像處理技術,以提高動態感知能力。這種改良的連通能力將使一系列新技術和任務成為可能,從超音速和高超音速防御到彈性衛星組網和多跳網絡。

  頻譜將在5G的運營、開發和推廣中發揮關鍵作用。峰值數據速率由無線服務可用的頻譜數量決定。在4G中,最多可以將5個20兆赫的信道連接在一起。但在5G中,可以連接多達5個100兆赫的信道,使速度比4G和4G LTE快約20倍左右。雖然部分5G技術將被部署到目前使用的蜂窩頻譜中,并在性能上實現一定的提高(LTE已經相當優化),但全面的5G開發將需要更多的頻譜,以便為消費者、國防部或其他部門提供性能上的進一步改進。

  全球領域目前采用兩種方法部署數百兆赫的5G新頻譜。第一種的重心放在6GHz以下的電磁(EM)頻譜上(“低到中頻段頻譜”,也稱為“Sub-6”),主要在3GHz 和4 GHz頻段。第二種方法側重于24~300GHz之間的頻段(“高頻頻譜”或“毫米波”),這是目前美國、韓國和日本采用的方法(雖然三國也在不同程度上探索Sub-6頻段)。美國的運營商主要專注于5G的毫米波部署,因為世界其他地區使用的5G的3GHz和4GHz頻譜大部分是美國獨有的聯邦頻段,特別是國防部廣泛使用的頻段。

  頻譜分配問題是5G競爭的核心,對于可選的頻譜波段,無論是Sub-6還是毫米波,都將影響5G發展的方方面面。3Ghz和4Ghz之間的頻譜波段主導了全球的5G活動,因為相比于毫米波頻譜,3Ghz和4Ghz的傳播范圍得到了改善,能用更少的基站數量提供相同的覆蓋范圍和性能。由于美國的大部分子Sub-6頻段不可民用和商用,美國運營商和控制美國民用頻譜的聯邦通信委員會(FCC)將毫米波頻譜作為國內5G的核心。

  美國運營商可能會繼續探索毫米波,但如果沒有追隨者,就不可能在5G領域領先。無線網絡的領導地位要求全球市場認可并遵循領導者所制定的頻譜頻段規范,因為這些5G子組件和產品最終將推動跨網絡的互通。世界其他地區與美國運營商相比,并不存在相同的Sub-6頻段限制問題,所以他們后續將在該范圍內尋求5G的發展。因此,如果美國繼續探索與世界其他國家不同的頻譜范圍,可能會發現自己沒有全球供應鏈基礎。

  如果世界上大多數國家采用的未來5G生態系統是建立在Sub-6中頻頻譜之上,美國也將面臨毫米波設備通用性的挑戰和Sub-6基礎設施安全問題。隨著Sub-6成為全球標準,目前在這一領域處于領先地位的中國很可能會成為這一階段的引領者。這將給依賴供應鏈中有中國組件網絡的國防部海外行動帶來安全風險。即使美國限制國內使用中國設備供應商的產品,但美國在無線領域的市場規?;共還淮?,無法阻止中國5G供應商繼續在全球范圍內增加市場份額,從而對一批將服務于美國市場的供應商造成巨大壓力。由于市場份額下降以及競爭產品造成的數量限制,美國國防部和美國工業產業更好和更便宜的全球供應鏈將很可能被剝奪,進而導致美國供應商無法投資研發未來的5G產品。

  中國計劃部署第一個廣泛使用的5G網絡,其首批Sub-6網絡服務將于2020年投入使用。先發優勢可能會推動智能手機和電信設備供應商以及國內半導體和系統供應商的市場大幅增長。因此,中國的互聯網公司將為其國內市場開發基于5G速度和低延遲性能的服務和應用程序。隨著5G在全球以類似的頻段部署,中國的智能手機和互聯網應用及服務很可能占據主導地位,即便它們被美國市場排除在外。中國在5G領域的發展,將重現美國在4G領域的輝煌。

  第1章:5G的歷史和概述

  技術產生的歷史

  移動無線技術已經發展了幾十年,第一代(1G)于20世紀70年代末推出,80年代初投入使用。從那時起,新一代的技術和無線標準每隔十年左右就會推出一次,最終達到我們目前在4G和5G能力之間過渡的狀態。每一代技術的價值都呈指數級增長,因為每一代技術都推動了商業和軍事領域的一系列技術進步。現有的各代技術均集中在中低頻段(小于6GHz或小于6),但5G也為毫米波頻譜的使用打開了大門。

  1G(語音通話):1G移動網絡在20世紀80年代初投入使用,它具備語音通信和有限的數據傳輸能力(早期能力約為2.4Kbps)。1G網絡利用模擬信號使用類似AMPS和TACS等標準在分布式基站(托管在基站塔上)網絡之間“傳遞”蜂窩用戶。

  2G(消息傳遞):在20世紀90年代,2G移動網絡催生出第一批數字加密電信,提高了語音質量、數據安全性和數據容量,同時通過使用GSM標準的電路交換來提供有限的數據能力。上世紀90年代末,2.5G和2.75G技術分別使用GPRS和EDGE標準提高了數據傳輸速率(高達200Kbps)。后來的2G迭代通過分組交換引入了數據傳輸,為3G技術提供了進身之階。

  3G(有限數據:多媒體、文本、互聯網):20世紀90年代末和21世紀初,3G網絡通過完全過渡到數據分組交換,引入了具有更快數據傳輸速度的3G網絡,其中一些語音電路交換已經是2G的標準,這使得數據流成為可能,并在2003年推出了第一個商業3G服務,包括移動互聯網接入、固定無線接入和視頻通話。3G網絡現在使用UMTS和WCDMA等標準,在靜止狀態下將數據速度提高到1Gbps,在移動狀態下提高到350Kbps以上。

  4G和LTE(真實數據:動態信息接入,可變設備):2008年推出4G網絡服務,充分利用全IP組網,并完全依賴分組交換,數據傳輸速度是3G的10倍。由于4G網絡的大帶寬優勢和極快的網絡速度提高了視頻數據的質量。LTE網絡的普及為移動設備和數據傳輸設定了通信標準。LTE正在不斷發展,目前正在發布第12版?!癓TE-A”的速度可達300MBps。

  5G:5G的技術能力和應用范圍仍有待確定。頻譜的選擇和網絡使用環境將決定數據傳輸的速度、容量和延遲。例如,5G毫米波可以在無限制的特定條件下為固網提供難以置信的高速網絡,但在小區邊緣這一速度將很難維持。5G Sub-6的速度低于毫米波,但可以提供廣域覆蓋,不會受到環境因素的干擾。目前5G的相關標準正在全球范圍內進行研發,以上條件將最終決定5G的“標準”。

  歷史的經驗:代系更迭的先發優勢

  在5G之前的幾代更迭過渡中,對領導者國家產生了巨大的商業價值、市場競爭和安全影響。以德國為首的歐洲為例,在2G時代獲得了第一個競爭優勢,諾基亞和愛立信等公司可以更早地推出更先進的設備,并在2000至2010年已經開始向3G轉型,而當時的美國仍在推行2G。在這一時期歐洲無線技術產業蓬勃發展,而美國公司則在努力跟上發展步伐。在3G轉型期間,歐洲失去了這一優勢,因為當時的監管部門要求對3G頻譜資源進行拍賣,而不是把現有的2G頻譜進行重新規劃調整,因此貽誤先機。日本在3G方面處于領先地位,雖然美國最終趕上了日本,但卻花了數年時間。隨著日本加快推進3G,美國企業付出了巨大代價。在這一轉型過程中,美國失去了數千個工作崗位和可觀的收入。在此期間,多家無線技術公司倒閉或被收購到外國公司中。

  美國在4G和4G LTE的發展中吸取了教訓。盡管3G的實施進度很慢,但后來的幾年內,美國加大3G投資建設力度,最終使其在4G到來時全面占據先機。此外,FFC還開放了更多頻段的許可,并制定了相關規定,以促進4G網絡的快速擴張。起初,日本緊跟其后,但日本相關產業界未能迅速開發形成成熟的4G生態系統,因此,美國在4G智能設備市場上處于領先地位,并最終在全球取代了日本的操作系統。

  在2010年初,AT&T和Verizon利用2008年拍賣贏來的700MHz頻段,迅速在美國各地部署LTE網絡。美國成為繼芬蘭之后第一個全面鋪開LTE網絡的國家,LTE的網絡性能大約是現有3G網絡的10倍。這種性能上的革新推動了4G手機的迅速普及,采用新SOC的手機不僅可以傳輸更多的數據,而且計算速度也快得多。蘋果、谷歌、Facebook、亞馬遜、Netflix等美國公司以及無數其他公司,都利用LTE網絡帶來的大帶寬和新手機功能,研發了新的應用程序和服務。隨著LTE技術在其他國家的推廣,4G手機和4G應用程序服務也傳遍了全球,推動美國在全球無線和互聯網服務領域占據主導地位。

  美國從這一領先優勢中受益匪淺。ReconAnalytics在2018年4月發布的一份報告中估計,2011年至2014年間,4G的引入為無線行業貢獻了70%的增長,不僅提高了GDP,同時無線行業的就業崗位增加了80%以上。通過引領4G的發展,美國建立了一個由網絡供應商、設備制造商和應用程序開發商組成的全球生態系統,這種成熟的生態系統塑造了4G的未來,也為其他國家建設4G提供了寶貴經驗。

  領導者的優勢在無線通信更新換代中尤為明顯,因為領導者可以

  對未來的產品設定基礎架構標準和規范。例如,中國正在本土鋪設光纜,并計劃為參與“一帶一路”的同盟國家鋪設光纜,同時還要在整個歐洲建設5G網絡。此舉將讓中國有選擇的使用某些5G公司和產品投入到這項偉大工程中。中國正在利用這個機會推廣Sub-6頻段的使用,這將影響整個5G產品市場的未來發展。如果有企業想在中國或任何與中國合作建設5G的地方銷售5G產品,那將必須按照中國的要求建造網絡,并與中國企業合作。如此一來將增加了整個供應鏈中產品后門和漏洞的風險。

  升級5G將帶來與4G相比規模更大的潛在風險和回報。5G時代的領導者將在未來10年間獲得數千億美元的收入,并在無線技術領域創造廣泛的就業機會。5G也有可能給其他行業帶來革命性的變化:更快、更大的數據吞吐量,自動駕駛等技術將獲得巨大發展。5G還將通過增加多個設備之間的數據量和速度來增強物聯網,甚至取代許多家庭所依賴的固網寬帶。擁有5G的國家將擁有更多的創新,并為世界其他地區設定標準。由于以下原因,這個國家目前不太可能是美國。

  頻譜的使用和選擇

  部署一個切實可行的5G網絡,頻譜的選擇和可利用性是最重要的因素,因為這將決定數據傳輸的速度、容量和延遲。4G數據傳輸能力無法跟上當前的需求,而5G的升級將通過部署使用毫米波、Sub-6頻段或兩者混用的方式組網,來解決速度和衰減的問題。下面將描述毫米波和Sub-6頻段的優劣勢,以及它們在未來5G生態系統中的潛在應用和角色。

  毫米波

  毫米波在30GHz到300GHz之間的高頻中工作,毫米波之所以具有這么大的吸引力有很多原因。首先,波長較短的毫米波會產生較窄的波束,從而為數據傳輸提供更好的分辨率和安全性,且速度快、數據量大,時延小。其次,有更多的毫米波帶寬可用,不僅提高了數據傳輸速度,還避免了低頻段存在的擁堵(在研究毫米波頻率應用在5G之前,該頻段的主要運用在雷達和衛星業務)。5G毫米波生態系統需要大規模的基礎建設,但可以獲得比4G LTE網絡高20倍的數據傳輸速度。最后,毫米波組件比低頻段的組件更小,因此可以更緊湊地部署在無線設備上。除了物理特性之外,毫米波對美國5G開發商也極具吸引力,因為美國政府擁有大量的Sub-6頻譜資源,尤其是在3~4GHz范圍,這使得運營商很難在FCC拍賣會上購買Sub-6牌照,甚至難以共享這一部分頻譜資源。

  毫米波擁有著諸多好處的同時也面臨著各種挑戰。雖然短波長和窄光束的特性可以提高分辨率和傳輸安全性,但這也限制了傳播距離。因為毫米波網絡需要遍布在基站覆蓋的整個區域中并保持不間斷的連接,這樣就會產生很高的基礎建設的成本。毫米波很容易被墻壁,樹葉和人體本身等障礙物阻擋,這進一步加劇了這一挑戰。毫米波在特定情況下可以覆蓋較寬的范圍,例如在樹頂上方有平坦反射窗的大型建筑物中,但是在美國很少有這樣的環境。

  美國已經開始展開毫米波和Sub-6基站建設的有效性研究了。MoffettNathanson LLC最近對Verizon在薩克拉門托5G毫米波工作進行了分析,經過6個月的市場實踐后,發現Verizon的150個固定無線寬帶(FWBB)基站只能向測試地區約6%的用戶提供服務。Verizon一直將薩克拉門托用戶特別密集的地區作為最佳測試環境,并專注于開發固定無線網絡,這比部署移動網絡的毫米波挑戰更小。然而,即使在這些優質的環境中,提高這個解決方案的可行性仍需要大量的基礎建設和時間成本。

  谷歌也對國防創新委員會進行了初步的研究,以確定毫米波部署所需的大致資金成本和基站數量,使用28GHz頻段中的425 MHz的頻譜資源(目前美國5G試驗的毫米波配置標準),相比使用3.4GHz頻段中的250 MHz的頻譜資源(Sub-6,中國5G試驗和部署的標準),兩者都部署在現有的72,735個宏蜂窩塔和屋頂上(最簡單的部署選擇),毫米波的部署以每秒100Mbps的速度覆蓋11.6%的人口,以每秒1Gbps的速度蓋率3.9%的人口。在中國Sub-6標準中,相同的基站以每秒100Mbps的速度覆蓋57.4%的人口,以每秒1Gbps的速度覆蓋21.2%的人口。該研究使用了包括樹葉結構陰影的高分辨率地理空間數據,但沒有考慮到人體或車輛的陰影,存在于部署環境中,并且會進一步破壞毫米波的網絡連接。

  由于電線桿的易用性和豐富性,大多數運營商正考慮在電線桿上部署毫米波5G站點。利用美國的電線桿數據庫的研究表明,28GHz的毫米波基站需要大約在電線桿上安裝1300萬個,將花費4000億美元,如此才能保證28GHz頻段下以每秒100 Mbps速度達到72%的覆蓋率、每秒1Gbps的速度達到大約55%的覆蓋率。下面的圖1和圖2顯示了28 GHz (毫米波)和3.4 GHz (Sub-6)在洛杉磯相對平坦的地區相同極點高度上部署的傳播差異(藍色表示100MBps的速度,紅色表示1GBps的速度):

  目前正在努力減輕這些物理層面的挑戰,如大規模MIMO和波束賦型。大規模MIMO是一種天線陣列,它將極大地擴展設備連接數和數據吞吐量,并將使基站能夠容納更多用戶的信號,并顯著提高網絡的容量(假設存在多個用戶射頻路徑)。波束賦型是一種識別特定用戶的技術,該技術可以最有效的把數據傳遞給特定用戶并減少附近用戶的干擾。雖然這些技術可以改善毫米波的傳播效率,但是在更大范圍內保持連接穩定仍然存在挑戰。在將毫米波作為一種更通用的無線網絡解決方案部署之前,還需要投入大量的時間和研發成本來解決毫米波的傳播特性問題。

  Sub-6 GHz

  Sub-6頻段包括低于6GHz的頻譜范圍。由于Sub-6波長較長,穿透障礙物的能力更強,可以提供比毫米波更寬更廣的區域覆蓋效果,連接中斷風險更低,因此與毫米波相比而言,Sub-6需要更少的資金投入和基站基礎建設,再利用上現有的4G基礎設施,這兩點使Sub-6成為潛在的5G標準??悸塹健爸泄俁取?,加快Sub-6的推出時間顯得非常重要。雖然毫米波最終可能部署在傳播速度和成本不受限制的特定環境中,但Sub-6可能是短期內讓5G覆蓋更廣泛的有效方案,進而將推動5G供應鏈的產品設計和制造,Sub-6將有更多的設備提供支持。

  為了最大限度地發揮5G的潛力,需要數百兆赫茲的連續帶寬以優化性能,而Sub-6頻譜已經擠滿了現有的無線系統。在美國,5G的Sub-6技術可能會通過LTE頻譜部署到現有的宏基站中,這將適度改善射頻系統性能,但速度不會達到相同條件下LTE的10倍。LTE在速度上曾超過3G十倍,5G未能實現同樣的突破,因此將削弱5G的Sub-6技術在美國部署的力度。

  在美國的另一個挑戰是,政府擁有大部分的Sub-6頻段,并限制它們的商用。想要允許Sub-6頻段的商用,可以重新規劃政府的頻段或者共享這些頻段,但這兩個方式的時間都相對過長。清除頻譜占用(將現有的用戶和系統遷移到頻譜的其他部分),然后通過拍賣、直接分配或其他方法將其釋放到民用部門所花費的平均時間通常在10年以上。共享頻譜是一個稍微快一點的過程,因為它不需要對現有的用戶進行徹底的改革,但即使是這樣,也要花費5年以上的時間。

  國防部內部也有合理擔憂,共享Sub-6頻譜中將產生頻譜優化到安全漏洞等一系列問題。如果國防部的操作員被迫共享他們的頻譜波段,有人擔心這可能會降低國防系統的性能,并且商業用戶的增加還會使Sub-6頻段產生擁塞,增加國防部系統設備連接中斷的風險。頻譜共享是有成功先例的——2010年,FCC向商用部門開放了3550-3700MHz帶寬(稱為公民寬帶無線電服務,簡稱CBRS)。然而,這一進程花了五年多的時間,在目前的競爭環境下是站不住腳的。本文將在第三章中更詳細地探討CBRS案例研究。

  鑒于毫米波和Sub-6的不同優劣勢,未來5G可能會采用兩者共用的組合。網絡覆蓋的很大一部分會利用Sub-6進行廣域覆蓋,毫米波可能最終能夠在特定的場景中提供更精細的覆蓋,并且由于毫米波更難攔截,在某些場地中具有一些獨特的軍事優勢。這將需要在毫米波頻譜中針對其傳播特性,開展進一步的研究和測試,從而降低毫米波部署所需的支出。在短時間內,3GHz和4GHz頻段可能會成為驅動5G基礎設施和設備部署的全球頻段。在目前5G發展和頻譜使用的狀況下,美國不太可能使用Sub-6技術,更不用說像10年前4G時代那樣在頻譜部署方面領先于世界其他國家了。

  第2章:5G競爭領域的現狀

  每個國家的5G能力可以通過五個指標進行比較:頻譜可用性,廣泛的5G試驗,國家監管機構建立的5G路線圖,政府承諾(例如,為5G實施鋪平道路的戰略文件和政策),以及行業對早期5G發展的承諾。在這些指標中,頻譜可用性影響最大,因為許多其他因素都依賴于可用性。對于頻譜可用性,目前正在討論Sub-6 GHz與毫米波的優點以及如何在這兩個范圍的頻譜中分配頻譜,而在美國,對于為商業部門分配或共享政府擁有的頻譜存在很大的擔憂。對于基礎設施,運營商可以采取“非獨立”方式,利用現有的3G和4G基礎設施作為實現全5G功能的跳板,或者還可以采取“獨立”方法,這就需要大量的前期投資來為5G網絡提供新的基礎設施。

  中國

  中國通過一系列積極的投資和頻譜分配舉措,在5G發展方面處于領先地位。除了在五年內為5G部署投入180億美元的資本支出外,中國還向三大運營商分配了200 MHz的中頻頻譜,并正在考慮重新分配500 MHz的C頻段頻譜。在國內,中國的5G部署正在通過其主要的電信公司(中國移動,中國聯通和中國電信)實施。這三家公司主要致力于在中國開發獨立的5G網絡,并計劃在2019年部署預商用應用,并在2020年正式商業應用。中國目前已部署約35萬個5G可操作基站,幾乎是美國部署的10倍。在全球范圍內,中國的大型制造商(華為和中興)正在通過銷售主要用于非獨立網絡的5G支持設備和裝置來推動5G部署,華為已經向海外運送了超過10,000個基站。

  在海外,中國一直在與國家和外國公司保持合作,以擴大其5G的影響力。在歐洲,盡管美國官員要求盟友阻止中國公司,華為和中興仍然正在為個別國家的5G網絡提供建設的服務,并簽署了多項5G合同。此外,中國在“一帶一路”計劃中投入了大量時間和資源,包括推動中國建設的網絡基礎設施,以提供跨越整個路線的連通性。這一策略已經取得了一些成功:在2018年第三季度,華為在全球通信設備市場占有28%的份額,比2015年上升了4個百分點。隨著更多地區的5G網絡依賴中國通信設備推出,預計華為的市場份額將繼續增長。這些努力將使中國能夠推廣其首選的5G網絡標準和規范,并將在未來主導全球的5G產品市場。

  總體而言,這些方法使得中國在5G的技術和能力方面具有競爭優勢。中國的5G戰略應該是從中國共產黨的大戰略出發的。與人工智能(AI)一樣,5G開發是習近平主席“中國夢”愿景和“中國制造2025”路線圖的重要組成部分。社會穩定和經濟增長是中共的首要任務,因為這兩個領域的失敗直接威脅到現有政權的穩定,而5G有可能減少中國對外國投資的依賴,將中國從資本和勞動密集型制造業經濟轉變為創新型和消費驅動型經濟。鑒于中國經濟增長放緩以及與美國的持續貿易戰,中共可能會要求更積極地推行像5G這樣的技術革新計劃來緩解受到的壓力。

  韓國

  由于政府較早的完成頻譜拍賣以及其對無線技術的普遍承諾,韓國在5G發展上密切緊跟中國。韓國政府制定了明確的包括通過健康投資來追求5G的5G發展路線圖;2014年,韓國承諾提供15億美元,以促進在2020年實現5G的應用和部署,同時在2017年,韓國發布了國家寬帶和頻譜規劃(“K-ICT”),來進一步推動5G的發展。根據K-ICT計劃,韓國科學和信息通信技術部(MSIT)已經將Sub-6 GHz和毫米波頻段中超過1,000 MHz的頻譜拍賣給其三大電信提供商(SK Telecom,KT Corp和LG Uplus)。韓國與AT&T和Verizon密切合作開發5G毫米波網絡,通過使其開發的設備在兩個頻段范圍內都能正常運行(如其Exynos 5100 5G調制解調器的情況),降低了發展Sub-6 GHz和毫米波的風險。AT&T還與三星合作,在2019年底發布了支持毫米波和Sub-6 GHz的手機,但鑒于在美國可使用的Sub-6 GHz頻段范圍有限,這些雙功能設備的性能可能較低。

  韓國能夠利用2018年平昌冬季奧運會來展示其對于5G的投資和進行的各種網絡試驗。韓國通信產業一直持續著4G和LTE網絡技術的高強度競爭,這將推動5G的進一步快速發展。盡管SK Telecom目前不僅在投資5G和試驗5G的領域處于領先地位,同時還能夠在2018年的MSIT拍賣中獲得最多的頻譜帶寬,但三家通信運營商都計劃在2019年初為“韓國5G日”同步推出5G蜂窩服務。韓國在5G領域處于領先地位,并且只要其主要的通信運營商能夠好好利用他們拍賣的頻譜帶寬,韓國將保持領先的地位繼續前進。

  日本

  日本在5G能力方面緊隨中國,韓國和美國。日本尚未向通信運營商提供關鍵頻段的拍賣,但計劃在2019年這樣做,目前日本正在研究毫米波和Sub-6 GHz的使用方法(毫米波適用于有限的,人口密集的地理區域,而Sub-6 GHz則用于覆蓋其余地區)。與韓國類似,日本希望利用2020年東京奧運會來展示和測試5G的技術和網絡,并將其大部分投資和活動推向2020年的時間線。2014年,日本成立了5G移動論壇(5GMF),以推動5G的研究和發展,協調各組織的5G工作,提升5G的普遍認知。2016年,日本內政和通信部(MIC)發布了一份戰略文件(“2020年實現5G的無線電政策”),該文件展示了其對5G的承諾和未來部署。

  日本的三大電信供應商(NTT DOCOMO,KDDI和Softbank)正在測試5G技術,目的是在2020年奧運會之前實現5G商用。這三家公司都在Sub-6 GHz和毫米波頻段范圍內進行試驗,MIC在東京和日本鄉村進行了“5G系統試驗”。

  世界其他地區(非美國)

  雖然中國,韓國,美國和日本在該領域處于領先地位,但世界其他地區仍在追趕5G部署。英國,德國和法國可以被視為“第二梯隊”5G發展領域的國家,而新加坡,俄羅斯和加拿大則構成“第三梯隊”,而世界其他地區也是如此。這些國家開始計劃在不同的時間線和頻譜范圍上拍賣頻譜帶寬,但許多國家缺乏任何正式的政策或戰略來實現5G,并且大多數國家預計在2020年之后實現5G的商用,晚于其他國家的2020年時間框架。

  盡管歐洲已經將收費引入2G,但由于法規限制其無法快速的提供頻譜帶寬,歐洲在3G,4G和現在的5G方面仍然落后。亞洲其他地區在5G方面取得了一些進展,但很少有國家投入與中國、日本和韓國相同的時間和資源。俄羅斯于2017年發布了“俄羅斯聯邦數字經濟”,其中包括5G規劃圖,但尚未制定任何明確的頻譜規劃或為該規劃圖投入大量資源。俄羅斯利用2018年的FIFA世界杯開展了一些5G努力,但仍然高度依賴外國的5G的技術和合作伙伴關系來推動其5G的發展。

  鑒于第一梯隊與其他國家之間的5G進步差距,世界其他地區可能會被動采用第一梯隊任何國家領先的5G的網絡設計和基礎設施。中國是目前的領導者,美國的盟國在如何應對中國制定5G標準的行動方面采取了不同的立場。由于擔心安全問題,一些國家對中國的影響力持警惕的態度,并積極阻止中國的5G推廣。例如,12月,捷克共和國網絡安全機構(NUKIB)發布官方警告,稱華為和其他中國公司構成國家安全風險,引用中國現行法規(2017年6月27日頒布的國家情報法),要求中國公司積極配合其國家情報部門的合作。這推動了捷克公共和私營部門的安全審查,有效地阻止了華為5G產品進入該國。澳大利亞和波蘭也對中國采取強硬立場,美國一直在向其他盟國施壓,要求其效仿捷克。

  然而,考慮到中國5G產品的價格和質量,其他國家對將中國趕出本國5G市場的熱情并不高。德國拒絕禁止華為,盡管美國威脅要切斷情報共享,英國似乎也可能采取同樣的做法。德國和英國都駁斥了美國的說法,即華為和其他中國通信信公司對國家安全構成不可接受的風險,稱它們的安全機構可以采取措施限制網絡中的漏洞。印度和意大利也表示,它們不愿將華為的產品排除在5G產品之外。最近幾個月,新西蘭放松了最初對中國的強硬立場。未來幾個月,歐洲將繼續成為5G未來的戰場,因為歐洲是華為最大的市場之一,也是美國盟友的主要所在地。這場斗爭還表明了世界其他地區對于5G態度的一個趨勢——特別是對成本更敏感的發展中國家將發現中國5G的價格點難以拒絕,特別是基礎設施以及“一帶一路”倡議等項目融資激勵措施使報價非??曬凼?。

  美國

  私營部門

  在美國政府的支持下,通信行業正在努力組織5G在美國開發和部署。Verizon,AT&T,Sprint和T-Mobile都在開發自己的5G網絡和5G設備,每個運營商都有自己的策略和方法。Verizon和AT&T專注于開發高頻毫米波網絡,并且正在各種測試城市中為移動和固定應用部署小型蜂窩,Sprint采用毫米波和中頻頻譜的聯合方法來構建其網絡,T-Mobile專注于毫米波和低頻段頻譜。雖然所有運營商都在某種程度上研究了Sub-6 GHz下的頻譜選擇,但相對于毫米波頻段中可用的數百GHz,這些研究本質上都受到Sub-6 GHz中可用帶寬較小的限制,這種限制由于Sub-6GHz下絕大部分頻譜的頻段是美國政府擁有的變得更加嚴厲。運營商們正在使用現有的4G基礎設施,但那些專注于毫米波的運營商將不得不建設額外的基礎設施,以確保通過密集的基站網絡實現不間斷的連接。關于部署的某些網絡是否符合真正的5G標準存在爭議,同時這些提供商之間在未來幾年內推出5G網絡的競爭會非常的激烈。5G的發展正在由3GPP(第三代合作伙伴計劃)監督,該標準組織也負責監督3G UMTS(包括HSPA)和4G LTE標準的發展。

  盡管消息來自美國各種營銷活動,但美國領土上已經部署了可以在覆蓋邊緣提供100 Mbps到1 Gbps服務的5G基礎設施。盡管LTE部署導致美國大部分地區的終端用戶速度提高了10倍,但迄今為止,運營商尚未展示出能夠為美國大部分人口提供高速傳輸的部署能力。

  如第一章所述,美國運營商在為較小的區域部署有限制的毫米波方面取得了一些成功,但基站的未來可擴展性是有限制的。即使在優化的情況下,顯然對毫米波進行分頻以提供更多的覆蓋需要大量建設基礎設施,這是一項極其消耗時間和成本的工作。

  考慮到建設這些毫米波網絡所需的大量基站所帶來的風險,這些運營商甚至無法承諾必要的資本支出。截至2018年底,Verizon持有約120億美元債務,股息收益率約為4%,而AT&T持有約175億美元債務,股息收益率超過6%。T-Mobile持有約25億美元的債務,而Sprint持有約400億美元的債務。這些公司處于美國開發5G的努力的最前沿,但他們的資產負債表顯示他們可能會為完整毫米波網絡的推廣和建設基礎設施的的成本而苦苦掙扎。

  在過去十年中,無線供應商產業也發生了重大轉變。中國通信設備巨頭華為的全球收入從2009年的約280億美元增長到2018年的1070億美元。同期愛立信的收入從279億美元下降到239億美元,而諾基亞的收入從576億美元下降到266億美元。盡管美國市場的銷售額從2009年的不到6%增長到2018年的30%以上,并且仍在快速增長。例如,印度代表的無線市場比美國大,在印度銷售的所有手機中有59.7%是中國制造的。由百度,阿里巴巴,騰訊和一些最近興起的新公司(抖音等)領導的中國互聯網應用公司的影響力和收入都在增長。2009年,收入排名前十的互聯網公司都是美國公司。今天,前10名的互聯網公司中有4名是中國公司。

  這些轉變不僅僅是因為中國設備更便宜。在許多情況下,中國設備也優于其西方競爭對手?;橢行送ㄑ妒譴蠊婺IMO無線電系統的領導者,擁有64個發射和接收元件。許多人認為華為的P系列和Mate系列的安卓手機是世界上最先進的手機,這些設備由華為自己的海思芯片部門提供芯片支持的。阿里巴巴的云服務在全球排名第四,僅次于亞馬遜,微軟和谷歌,并且增長迅速。

  公共部門:白宮

  在過去十年中,美國政府對5G的興趣一直在增加。2016年,白宮推出了價值4億美元的先進無線研究計劃,以推廣無線測試平臺,而美國聯邦通信委員會通過其“頻譜前沿”政策,承諾為許可和未經許可的用途發布大量毫米波頻譜。在現任政府的領導下,美國政府對5G的興趣有所增加,該政府提出了一系列倡議和指令,強調了5G的重要性,并制定了明確的路線圖。現任政府支持由私營部門主導的5G計劃,而不是由政府主導的國有化5G計劃。

  2018年9月,白宮舉行了一次5G峰會,相關政府領導人和產業代表參加并討論5G的未來發展方向,促進私營公共部門合作,同時承認美國在開發和部署5G方面落后。不久之后,白宮發布了“關于制定美國未來可持續頻譜戰略的總統備忘錄”,強調美國需要領導5G,以促進國家安全和公共及私營領域的創新。備忘錄指示各部門和機構提交關于當前頻譜使用和未來要求,頻譜重新分配選項以及未來技術對頻譜分配影響的若干報告,并且還要求提出5G立法,監管和政策建議。在總統備忘錄發布的同一天,白宮發布了一篇題為“美國將贏得5G全球競賽”的文章,研究了從領導4G發展獲得的美國優勢(例如,增加的GDP和就業機會),并將其與領導5G發展的潛在好處進行比較。

  公共部門:聯邦通信委員會(FCC)

  在頻譜劃分和民用頻譜政策方面,聯邦通信委員會在5G的開發和部署中發揮著重要作用。在2018年末,聯邦通信委員會投票決定建立一個釋放毫米波頻譜帶寬的框架,以幫助加快5G的開發和部署。

  美國聯邦通信委員會主導著美國頻譜拍賣,并于2018年底舉行了首次5G頻譜拍賣,開啟了28 GHz頻段。第二次拍賣于2019年3月14日舉行,提供了24 GHz頻段。

  美國聯邦通信委員會于2018年9月發布了全面的5G戰略“促進美國在5G技術(FAST)計劃中的優勢”。該計劃重點關注三個主要目標:推動更多頻譜進入市場,更新基礎設施的政策和在現代化中過時的法規,促進美國的5G發展。關于頻譜目標,美國聯邦通信委員會計劃在2019年再舉辦三次拍賣以銷售毫米波頻譜帶寬,并正在進行研究來了解開放低頻和中頻頻譜的選擇不同帶來的不同影響。關于基礎設施目標,美國聯邦通信委員會正在努力提高聯邦、州和地方各級小型小組的審查速度,以便更快地部署5G。關于現代化目標,聯邦通信委員會專注于調整現有法規并制定新法規以支持5G部署,例如更新其網絡設備規則,以便更快地進行小區部署,并防止從對美國網絡構成安全威脅的其他國家的公司手中購買網絡設備。

  美國聯邦通信委員會開始了相關工作以便更靈活地使用位于3GHz和4GHz頻段中間的500 MHz C波段下行鏈路頻譜。2015年,在國際電聯世界無線電大會上,奧巴馬政府反對了將該頻段重新歸類為適合5G使用的IMT-2000劃分的提議,對該頻段的重新劃分將為5G移動業務這一頻譜的全球標準化鋪平道路。即使將頻譜重新分類為寬帶,也需要一段時間才能將現有用戶完全從C頻段中移除。共享靈活用于5G的頻帶是困難的,因為移動手機以輻射的模式發射無線電能量,并且在C波段天線附近操作的用戶數量可能對衛星接收造成干擾。但是,固定業務可以通過使用高度定向天線或波束成形系統來共享頻譜,這種類型的設備非常適合為農村地區提供固定業務,以及可能用于國防部固定網絡擴展的任務。

  如果美國積極尋求共享和最終重新分配C波段下行鏈路頻譜,這可能允許第二輪5G頻譜擴展,這可以使美國的現有通信網絡的速度和覆蓋范圍得到提升。然而,這種頻譜重新分配的好處將取決于全球的設備商們開發的設備是否在C波段內運行,所以美國需要推動全球接受該部分頻譜作為全球利用頻段。

  公共部門:商務部

  美國商務部的國家電信和信息管理局(NTIA)管理聯邦使用頻譜分配。商務部目前正在制定“國家頻譜戰略”,以改進頻譜管理,確定研究和發展優先事項,以創造新技術,并匯總聯邦機構的頻譜業務需求。NTIA將與新的頻譜戰略工作組(由總統備忘錄建立)合作,共同努力制定和實施該國家戰略,并協調研究,開發,測試和評估工作。如果國防部要分享其頻譜,就必須與NTIA密切合作,以管理該共享過程。

  第3章:國防部的發展和5G技術的采用

  5G對國防部的影響

  雖然5G的大部分討論圍繞著商業部門作為其推出背后的驅動力,但5G技術生態系統同樣可以徹底改變國防部的運營,網絡和信息流程。國防部必須積極參與才能追上不斷變化的5G環境。5G將實現在地理上分散的系統中近乎實時地共享更大量的數據這一新的運營理念。目前,使用傳統通信網絡無法有效地完成該規模的數據共享。5G使當下網絡業務的延遲將變得更低,數據傳輸能力和容量將變得更大,但5G最大的應用潛力在于對未來戰爭或軍事網絡的潛在影響。在快速變化的戰場環境下,5G可以使大量價格低廉的、互聯的、更具安全彈性的設備和系統正常運作。

  5G能夠將國防部當前的分散網絡整合到一個網絡中,以促進改善態勢感知和決策。防御網絡范圍的擴大將使高超聲速武器和高超音速防御等新技術得以部署,并有可能加強核C3等現有任務。在企業層面,5G可以極大地改善物流、維護等日常工作,從而提高國防部的工作效率和速度。

  然而,5G也為國防部的未來帶來了嚴重的潛在風險。國防部在未來海外運營時,絕大多數網絡和系統可能依賴于5G基礎設施。如果中國在5G基礎設施和系統領域處于領先地位,那么國防部未來的5G生態系統可能會將中國組件嵌入其中。這將對國防部業務和網絡的安全構成嚴重威脅。此外,連接設備數量的增長增加了對手跨越國防部網絡的潛在“攻擊面”,這需要提高跨系統的警惕性和安全性。大量數據的傳輸會使此任務復雜化,因為這會使檢測網絡上的惡意流量變得更加困難。

  轉向Sub-6GHz的頻段

  在5G頻段方面,美國可能繼續選擇使用毫米波,而以中國為代表的其他國家則主要采用的是Sub-6 GHz頻段。國防部作為一個在海外運營的政府實體,無論美國如何選擇在國內實施5G,國防部最終都必須學會在Sub-6 GHz的基礎設施上運營5G網絡。因此,美國必須在提高Sub-6 GHz能力上加大投資,并采取措施分享其頻譜。然而,國防部內部存在合理的擔憂,即開放Sub-6 GHz頻段將產生許多運營問題,從頻譜優化到安全漏洞。如果國防部運營商被迫分享他們的頻段,有人擔心這可能會暫時或永久地降低系統的性能。增加商業用戶也會使得Sub-6 GHz頻譜的整體更加擁塞,增加國防部運營商連接中斷的風險。

  但是,如果美國和美國國防部不會轉向Sub-6 GHz,國防部將面臨獲得和落實5G部署的進一步挑戰。盡管毫米波的組件通常比Sub-6 GHz的組件更緊湊,但毫米波需要更多的基站彼此靠近以保持連接(即便如此,仍然存在干擾的風險,例如汽車在基站前移動或惡劣的天氣將中斷連接)。如果一個人或平臺必須攜帶多個天線,特別是在邊緣,這在邏輯上很快就會變得不切實際。對處于戒備或者戰斗狀態下的軍隊單位需要攜帶多個天線來保證軍事網絡的通訊順暢在邏輯上是不切實際的。此外,國防部的獲得系統是緩慢實現的并且可能需要數年才能為毫米波的網絡部署提供必要的系統,而大多數系統可能已經過時。相比于Sub-6 GHz的中頻頻譜,國防部和聯邦通信委員會目前優先考慮毫米波,特別聚焦于28GHz到37 GHz的頻段,但由于毫米波的部署不切實際,這是一個根本性的缺陷。國防部必須準備在Sub-6 GHz的5G生態系統中運行,這需要轉變戰略,并考慮國防部愿意在Sub-6 GHz領域的哪個頻段范圍分享帶寬。

  這種轉變可能帶來一些固有的好處。使用與任何其他公司或國家相同的基礎設施所帶來的匿名性提供了一種行業標準的安全形式。政府和民用的整合可以通過允許軍事流量“隱藏在視線中”來提供一層安全性,因為流量變得更難以看到和分離出來。同樣,可能會阻止對手干擾此頻譜,因為它們可能在同一頻段上運行。政府將維持初級頻譜接入,同時也受益于來自商業部門的技術進步,這些技術來自Sub-6 GHz范圍的業務,這將有助于政府縮小商業部門與當前軍事通信狀況之間的差距,也為網絡和通信人員提供了一個機會,通過在國內和國外定期共享并管理頻譜,學習如何使頻譜更具彈性。

  Sub-6GHz的頻譜共享道路

  頻譜共享的想法并不新鮮。2010年,美國聯邦通信委員會確定了3550-3700MHz的頻譜帶,稱為公民寬帶無線電業務(CBRS),作為潛在的頻譜共享機會。CBRS利用LTE網絡提供無線語音,文本和數據服務,由于聯邦通信委員會 2010年國家寬帶計劃為新移動用戶提供更多頻譜,因此該頻譜被釋放。2015年,美國聯邦通信委員會正式授權以前由美國海軍和國防部單獨使用的3.5 GHz頻段區域的共享。CBRS將增強光纖接入的“最后一英里”,以提供固定無線服務和點對多點功能。CBRS頻譜可以由用戶免許可,或者他們可以在使用期間購買臨時許可,并且允許以更快速和有效的方式部署服務。國防部仍然是該頻段的現任用戶,因此其他用戶將受到頻譜接入系統(SAS)的限制,該系統確保消除沖突以消除對軍事用途的干擾。SAS系統在頻段分配時保持國防部的優先級,但在未被占用時為商業用戶保持頻段開放。

  這一先例可以作為國防部與商業部門之間未來頻譜共享的指南。通過提供自己的帶寬來分享,國防部還可以鼓勵“雙向”頻譜共享系統,在這種系統中,民用和聯邦用戶可以通過不同的優先級來訪問彼此的頻譜。這將增加輔助級別上國防部可用的頻譜量,同時保持其自身帶寬中的優先級訪問。此外,由于本章開頭列出的原因,國防部將從5G開發中獲益。國防部可能會在開始分享部分頻譜的初期有一些成長的痛苦,但5G能力的凈增益最終將彌補這一痛苦。如果國防部沒有開始分享Sub-6 GHz的頻譜,那么美國公司將無法開發他們自己具有競爭優勢的Sub-6 GHz的5G產品,外國供應商將越來越多地嵌入他們的全球網絡和系統產品,這將增加依賴供應鏈而帶來網絡受損的風險。

  5G的安全挑戰

  供應鏈風險

  國防部正面臨的未來5G的環境風險之一就是供應鏈風險,從子部件到完整的網絡級再到服務級,層級越高,供應鏈存在的風險越大,也越容易被攻擊。在過去的幾十年中,國防部能夠在滿足其獨特需求的定制系統上運行,因為相對于其他商業世界而言它是一個大用戶,但現在這種特權已不復存在。商業部門的技術開發和使用使得國防部的技術發展和使用相形見絀,國防部在孤立的定制系統和架構上進行構建和運營已經不再實用。在即將到來的5G時代,國防部越來越依賴商用現貨(COTS)設備和商業服務。

  國防部可以將商業投入納入其5G基礎設施的四個層級:射頻組件,集成芯片組,設備和服務。射頻組件可包括從半導體到交換設備和放大器在內的各種子組件。集成芯片融合了不同的子組件和子系統來與系統組件進行交互。設備的范圍從移動設備的耳機到計算機系統,其中包括前面提到的子組件和集成芯片。最后,前三類基礎設施中的每一個都帶有一系列的服務產品,用于操作、管理和維護它們。

  商業公司可以提供上述任何和所有基礎設施,但這帶來了無意或惡意安全漏洞的風險,這些漏洞使國防部系統和網絡面臨風險。如果中國成為從子組件級到集成系統級提供5G基礎設施的全球領導者,即使美國限制中國產品進入美國市場,國防部的5G生態系統也將面臨包含安全漏洞在內的風險,因為國防部仍然需要在海外的外國網絡上運營,這些網絡的基礎設備也可能由中國的供應鏈來提供。在過去的十年中,國防部已經從定制計算系統轉向商用計算系統,但這種方法的改變比目前面臨的風險更小,因為美國主宰了計算系統市場并能夠“擁有”供應鏈和更好地?;に饈藶┒垂セ?。因此,國防部現在可以做到將不同程度的COTS產品納入其計算系統,同時將漏洞風險保持在可接受的水平。然而,在目前的5G競爭中,無論是國防部還是美國政府都無法決定5G供應鏈的內容和整合--我們專注于構建毫米波頻段的5G生態系統,使我們脫離了Sub-6 GHz頻段的5G生態系統的全球供應鏈。如果世界其他地區接受中國產品作為5G的更便宜和更優越的選擇,這種不匹配將給國防部帶來嚴重的安全風險。

  5G基礎設施和服務

  無論在什么頻段運行,5G網絡都有許多安全風險需要考慮。雖然國防部的安全重點通常是供應商安裝的可用于遠程控制系統或泄露信息的后門,但在5G推出期間和之后,由于糟糕的軟件開發實踐,也可能帶來各種各樣的安全問題。英國一份關于與華為和英國政府共同努力管理華為在英國部署的安全問題的報告中提到了其中的許多風險。糟糕的軟件開發帶來的安全問題是一個普遍的問題,而且不僅限于中國供應商。

  即使用于5G基站的特定軟件版本可能是安全且良好實施的,也不能保證未來版本將繼續同樣安全。將不可避免地發現錯誤并需要軟件補丁,并且可能需要快速部署這些修補程序,而無需充分考慮補丁可能引入的新安全問題。驗證每次迭代持續安全性將變得越來越具有挑戰性。

  即使基站代碼是安全的并且隨著時間的推移得到良好管理,無線基礎設施提供商的商業模型也是這樣的,即來自供應商的人員通常參與網絡基礎設施的調試,操作和維護。這要求供應商訪問運行網絡的核心管理系統,并允許供應商將軟件部署到系統中的設備。在許多情況下,美國境內外的網絡運營商將網絡的整個運營外包給設備供應商,通過第三方活動增加潛在的漏洞。

  現場維護通常也外包給供應商。訪問現場站點的服務人員可以將新軟件上載到網絡并更改網絡配置。國防部在打擊惡意軟件方面有著悠久的歷史,這些惡意軟件通過未打補丁的計算機傳播到武器系統中,沒有進行多因素身份驗證,或者由于人員使用不當而暴露于安全漏洞。所有這些和更多的問題適用于供應商維護計算機。這些支持系統很少被安全工程師檢查,但是它們可能配備了憑證,使其具有將漏洞插入基礎設施的強大功能。

  無線接入網(RAN)供應商通常決定核心網絡基礎設施的選擇,而這些基礎設施又管理著回程鏈路和全國光纖網絡上的流量。它們還提供核心身份驗證服務、執行合法攔截、名稱服務器功能和與互聯網的互連的能力。這種控制源于供應商使用非標準技術來實現通信和管理基站,以及整個無線網絡。因此,運營商可能難以為華為基站選擇非華為核心基礎設施。多供應商網絡通常被配置為公共供應商設備的孤島,如果發現供應商存在嚴重的安全問題,則在基礎設施中替換該供應商可能幾乎需要完全重新構建網絡。

  5G核心基礎設施還存在一些額外的問題,比如網絡“切片”功能,它會將網絡暴露給非運營商。例如,如果虛擬現實頭盔需要一個托管的網絡基礎設施片來與基于云的游戲服務通信,這將通過允許信令和控制邊緣和基于云的計算實體來增加核心網絡的攻擊面。

  5G設備

  除了5G基礎設施的安全性以外,國防部也必須考慮與5G設備相關的安全風險。如果目前中國在無線設備市場上占據主導地位的趨勢仍在繼續,即使中國廠商的設備被拒絕進入美國市場,由于其設備在世界其他地區的普及使得中國廠商的市場份額和復雜程度將繼續增長。在美國部署海外的部隊使用這些設備時,無論是公務還是個人用途,國防部都必須解決因使用這些設備而引起的問題。

  全球各種設備都發現了后門或安全漏洞的證據。其中許多似乎與中國情報部門要求公司向公眾提供有關國內用戶信息的要求有關。在最近案例中,諾基亞安卓手機被發現有一個后門,將各種數據發送到位于中國電信網絡的網絡服務器。諾基亞故意將此代碼構建到銷往中國的設備中,但后來意外地將其安裝到其他所有設備上。2018年,制造安全攝像頭的中國相機供應商雄邁的軟件被發現存在一個反向默認的無證后門用戶,可以訪問數百萬臺攝像機。

  這些事件和其他事件表明,中國的情報機構可能會要求在運往中國的設備上加裝后門,以協助其內部監控活動。由于軟件開發環境的性質,很難為發送到特定目的地的設備建立單獨維護的代碼庫集,其中一些代碼選項只能在特定目的地生效。當這些設備被運往中國境外時,這些后門仍然可以用來泄露信息。

  我們只能推測這些安全漏洞的傳播是有意還是無意。但是,如果中國政策確實要求在中國銷售的設備中嵌入后門訪問以用于內部安全目的,那么應用于這樣一個大市場的這種受損代碼會增加這些漏洞將蔓延到世界其他地方的風險。如果中國在5G設備市場上占據主導地位,無論是作為制造商還是作為一個龐大而有吸引力的用戶市場,那么這種脆弱性潛力只會繼續蔓延,并使更大的5G生態系統面臨風險。

  第4章:委員會對5G的建議

  理事會建議

  國防創新委員會的建議基于這樣的假設:由于傳播和成本限制,毫米波基本上不能在美國大規模部署,而且Sub-6 GHz的中頻頻譜(在3 GHz和4 GHz范圍內)將成為未來幾年廣域網的全球標準。該假設基于對毫米波的工程要求的評估以及各種研究,這些研究是關于預測支持有限毫米波的5G網絡所需的基礎設施和相關成本。此外,美國供應商的當前財務狀況可能或多或少的會抑制他們投資所需資本支出以支持毫米波網絡的能力。

  建議一

  國防部需要盡早制定共享Sub-6 GHz頻段的計劃以塑造未來的5G生態系統,包括評估什么時候需要共享哪些帶寬以及共享帶寬的范圍,以及共享將如何影響國防部系統。

  ? 國防部和聯邦通信委員會必須考慮將5G頻譜的戰略從毫米波(mmWave)轉向Sub-6 GHz。國防部和聯邦通信委員會一直將28GHz和37 GHz帶寬優先考慮作為5G開發的選項,但這種努力是錯誤的。這片文章涵蓋了與毫米波在實現方面相關的廣泛限制,以及世界其他地區將采用Sub-6 GHz的5G生態系統。鑒于此,國防部必須通過關注與這些頻譜范圍內的民用5G業務共存(如果不是明確共享)來為未來的運營環境做好準備。

  ? 國防部應該尤其關注中國已經使用的Sub-6 GHz頻段范圍。中國的5G系統和基礎設施工作在3.2-3.6GHz范圍內,以及4.8-5.0 GHz范圍。因此,商業界已經開發出針對該范圍配置的半導體和手機,國防部應該針對最發達的市場,加速在美國進行5G 6 Sub-6 GHz的部署。向復雜的多頻段收發器添加新頻段大約需要兩年時間,美國將能夠通過利用市場上已有的子組件和設備來實現更成熟的頻譜使用,例如使用現有的高通產品來實現中國5G系統使用的頻段,從而避免花費額外的時間來彌補追趕這兩年在5G研究上的落后。

  ? 作為額外考慮,國防部目前在4GHz頻譜中占用約500MHz的空間。國防部應該采取行動分享這個空間的一部分,因為它是一個可能對5G開發產生嚴重影響的大量帶寬。5G在大量連續帶寬上能夠最佳運行,而該范圍的共享可以提供推動5G發展的頻段空間。

  ? 為了提供額外的頻譜可用性,國防部應建議國家電信與信息管理機構(NTIA),聯邦通信委員會和國務院應在今年晚些時候的世界無線電大會(WRC-19)中提倡將C波段衛星頻譜重新分配給IMT-2000 5G使用,并采取措施,在加速的固定業務基礎上,在美國所有500 MHz頻段內實現頻段共享。雖然這對美國5G移動生態系統的影響有限,但在這個頻段內共享可以提供100 Mbps及以上的廣泛覆蓋,以便為美國農村的大部分地區提供固定寬帶服務。

  ? 國防部應鼓勵其他政府機構激勵行業采用通用的5G網絡進行Sub-6 GHz的部署。激勵措施包括加速折舊,稅收優惠,低息貸款以及政府購買設備和服務。

  ? 該建議不要求拆除在Sub-6GHz頻段中運行的國防部系統,也不要求共享所有國防部頻段。國防部必須對與共享不同頻段相關的成本和時間表進行深思熟慮且坦誠的分析,并相應地確定優先順序。

  ? 但是,國防部必須牢記,頻段劃分的現狀是不可能一直持續的。5G能力需要更大的頻譜帶,比如說毫米波,如果沒有額外的帶寬,僅靠Sub-6 GHz頻段美國并不能獲得真正的5G。明年,國防部將基于其使用的Sub-6 GHz頻段,決定在美國是否采用5G。

  ? 如果國防部分享其部分Sub-6 GHz的頻段,它將明顯受益。隨著商業部門開發和部署5G技術和網絡,國防部將能夠利用商業創新來建立自己新的和改進的技術和網絡。在戰略層面,5G可以通過將更多系統集成到一個能夠更快,更低延遲地共享更多數據的網絡中,在態勢感知和決策制定方面實現階段性變革。

  ? 這項工作需要與國家電信與信息管理機構密切協調,以清除和重新分配頻譜。僅僅分享頻譜是不夠的,時機才是至關重要的,必須盡快完成,以保持美國與中國,韓國和日本的競爭力。

  ? 如果沒有本報告中概述的積極行動,我們認為美國很可能無法說服世界其他國家采用毫米波技術作為標準的5G途徑。這可能會使全球市場分化,導致全球大多數采用 Sub-6技術來實現5G,這些技術將由中國設備和手機制造商主導。

  建議二

  國防部必須盡快準備在后西方無線生態系統中運行。該計劃應當包括對工程級和戰略級的系統安全和健壯性的研發資金計劃。

  ? 共享部分Sub-6GHz頻段當然將有助于美國5G的發展,但要獲得相對于中國的競爭優勢,就需要以國防部從未見過的速度和規模采取行動。出于這個原因,很可能美國以外的大多數國家將采用Sub-6GHz的解決方案,迫使國防部在后西方無線生態系統上運行。在這種情況下,國防部應該假設所有網絡基礎設施最終都會從加密和彈性角度受到網絡攻擊。

  ? 國防部必須采用“零信任”網絡模式。外圍防御模型已經被證明是無效的,5G只會加劇這個問題,因為更多的系統被連接到一個共同的網絡。不應僅僅通過附加到特定網絡來授予信息訪問權限,而應通過網絡內的各種安全檢查授予信息訪問權限。國防部還應該計劃采用量子抗性密鑰交換機制來應對公鑰交換算法的最終下降,特別是考慮到中國在量子計算方面的投資。

  ? 雖然“零信任”網絡可以通過密碼術?;ど舷攣慕換?,但這些交換仍將受到流量分析和網絡利用率激增的檢測。國防部應該努力保持大量數據不斷流動,以免操作節奏的增加被注意到。

  ? 除了這些安全預防措施之外,國防部還必須通過提高整體彈性和在整個網絡中建立冗余層來抵御網絡攻擊和滲透,以確保不間斷的連接。

  ? 國防部將需要考慮防范供應鏈受損的選擇,其中中國半導體元件和芯片組嵌入在多個系統中。國防部應該通過投入研發來研究劃分系統的影響,以限制攻擊者橫向移動到其他系統的能力。這將帶來性能的成本增加,國防部必須找到能夠安全性和基本功能的平衡點。

  ? 美國國防部應倡導積極?;っ攔際踔恫ǎ↖PR),以減緩中國電信生態系統的擴張。美國應該利用出口管制來減緩西方供應商的市場損失率,即使它可能會增加中國實現自給自足的速度。

  ? 國防部將越來越多地被迫在沒有他們參加的定制基礎設施的共享商業網絡上運營(如核C3的情況)。國防部必須分析與該轉變相關的風險和收益,并調整其運營概念以解決這一問題。

  ? 國防部需要考慮受損供應鏈的更廣泛影響,例如個人設備的風險和可以從這些設備上的活動中獲得的信息。如果中國能夠收集這些數據,國防部應考慮采用離散指令來抵御傳統國防部系統和平臺之外的這些漏洞,例如通過培訓來限制通過個人設備使用在無意中共享個人身份信息(PII)。

  ? 除了這些努力之外,國防部還應該在5G以上的未來幾代無線技術基礎上開展測試和實驗。這種測試和實驗將在更長的時間內進行,以確保美國準備領導下一代過渡。這些活動可以包括測試Sub-6 GHz頻段的共享,以及對未來的毫米波的部署和傳播的改進。

  建議三

  國防部應當建議美國政府調整貿易戰略來應對可能會將國家安全資產和使命置于威脅中的供應鏈漏洞。

  ? 受損的供應鏈問題會通過在網絡和系統中引入漏洞對國家安全構成嚴重威脅,這可能會被敵對行動者利用來破壞國防部的運營。這些脆弱性的蔓延通過降低進攻行動的障礙同時削弱防守陣地,創造了一個日益不穩定的環境。

  ? 為了應對這種威脅,國防部應該倡導貿易政策獎勵對安全代碼進行獎勵,并通過關稅懲罰有漏洞的代碼(良好發展實踐的“貨幣化”)。例如,美國可以自動對發現有后門或嚴重安全漏洞的任何國家的任何商品征收高額關稅(比如說75%)。這將給不安全因素帶來市場成本,并且還會激勵國內公司為安全研究人員提供資金,以發現競爭對手產品的脆弱性,從而觸發關稅。這將提高國防部生態系統的整體安全性,而不必披露條款50的漏洞。

  ? 美國應該鼓勵五眼(五國情報組織)和北約合作國家采用相同的關稅,無論產品來自哪個國家。和關注設備安全性相比,美國通過關稅貿易戰的形式可以獲取到更加多的利益。

  ? 國防部應建議CFIUS停止與有銷售過帶有后門和安全漏洞產品歷史的公司進行交易。

  ? 此外,美國應繼續鼓勵伙伴國家?;ぷ約旱墓┯α?,并拒絕接觸銷售5G商品的中國國有企業(SOEs)。

  TH

  附原文:

  ?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

  Executive Summary 2

  CHAPTER 1: 5G HISTORY AND OVERVIEW 5

  A History of Generation Technology 5

  History’s Lessons: First-Mover Advantage in Generation Transitions 6

  Spectrum Use and Options 8

  Millimeter Wave (mmWave) 8

  Sub-6 10

  CHAPTER 2: CURRENT STATE OF THE 5G COMPETITIVE FIELD 12

  China 12

  South Korea 13

  Japan 14

  Rest of World (Non-US) 15

  United States 16

  Private Sector 16

  Public Sector: White House 18

  Public Sector: FCC 18

  Public Sector: Department of Commerce 19

  CHAPTER 3: DoD DEVELOPMENT AND ADOPTION OF 5G TECHNOLOGY 21

  5G Impact on DoD 21

  Pivot to Sub-6 GHz 21

  A Path Forward for Sub-6 Spectrum Sharing 22

  Security Challenges in 5G 23

  Supply Chain Risks 23

  5G Infrastructure and Services 24

  5G Devices 25

  CHAPTER 4: BOARD RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 5G 27

  Board Recommendations 27

  Recommendation #1 27

  Recommendation #2 28

  Recommendation #3 30

  Recommendation #4 31

  Executive Summary

  The term “5G” refers to the oncoming fifth generation of wireless networks and technology that will produce a step-change improvement in data speed, volume, and latency (delay in data transfer) over fourth generation (4G and 4G LTE) networks. 5G will enable a host of new technologies that will change the standard of public and private sector operations, from autonomous vehicles to smart cities, virtual reality, and battle networks. Historical shifts between wireless generations suggest that the first-mover country stands to gain billions in revenue accompanied by substantial job creation and leadership in technology innovation. First movers also set standards and practices that were then adopted by subsequent entrants. Conversely, countries that fell behind in previous wireless generation shifts were obligated to adopt the standards, technologies, and architectures of the leading country and missed out on a generation of wireless capabilities and market potential.

  In the early 2010’s, AT&T and Verizon rapidly deployed LTE across the United States on the 700 Megahertz (MHz) spectrum they won at auction in 2008. Building on this deployment, the United States became the first country (after Finland) to see a comprehensive LTE network that delivered approximate 10x the consumer network performance of then-existing 3G networks. This step-change in performance drove rapid adoption of new handsets with new semiconductors that not only could move much more data, but were also computationally much faster. U.S. companies like Apple, Google, Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, and countless others built new applications and services that took advantage of that bandwidth. As LTE was deployed in other countries, those same handsets and applications spread across the world. This initiative helped drive global U.S. dominance in wireless and internet services, and created a U.S.-led wireless ecosystem on which the Department of Defense (DoD) and the rest of the world has operated for nearly a decade.

  Since the rollout of LTE, these wireless competitive landscape has undergone many changes. Chinese telecommunications equipment giant Huawei grew global revenues from approximately $28B in 2009 to $107B in 2018, while other traditional market leaders like Ericsson and Nokia have declined in revenue over that same period. Chinese handset vendors like Huawei, ZTE, Xiaomi, Vivo, and Oppo have rapidly grown in global market share, and are still growing rapidly in adoption and influence despite minimal sales in the U.S. market. In 2009, all of the top 10 Internet companies by revenue were American. Today, four of the top 10 are Chinese. These trends are already in effect, and 5G has the potential to skew future networks even further in the direction of China if it continues to lead.

  The shift from 4G to 5G will drastically impact the future of global communication networks and fundamentally change the environment in which DoD operates. While DoD will feel the impact of 5G, the rollout itself will be driven by the U.S. commercial sector. This study provides insight into the commercial landscape as well as the DoD landscape to give a comprehensive view of the stakeholders and future of 5G.

  5G has the ability to enhance DoD decision-making and strategic capabilities from the enterprise network to the tactical edge of the battlefield. 5G will increase DoD’s ability to link multiple systems into a broader network while sharing information in real time, improving communication across Services, geographies, and domains while developing a common picture of the battlefield to improve situational awareness. This improved connectivity may in turn enable a host of new technologies and missions, from hypersonics and hypersonic defense to resilient satellite constellations and mesh networks.

  Spectrum will play a key role in the operation, development and roll-out of 5G. Peak data rates are driven by the amount of spectrum that is available to a wireless service. In 4G, up to five 20 MHz channels can be bonded together. But in 5G, up to five 100 MHz channels can be bonded together, enabling speeds approximately 20x faster than 4G and 4G LTE. While some 5G technology will be deployed in the currently-used cellular spectrum and achieve modest gains in performance (LTE is already fairly well optimized), full 5G development will require significantly more spectrum to provide another step-change improvement in performance for consumers, DoD or otherwise.

  Countries are pursuing two separate approaches to deploy hundreds of MHz of new spectrum for 5G. The first focuses on the part of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum below 6 GHz (“Low- to Mid-Band Spectrum,” also referred to as “sub-6”), primarily in the 3 and 4 GHz bands. The second approach focuses on the part of the spectrum between ~24 and 300 GHz (“High-Band Spectrum,” or “mmWave”), and is the approach taken by the United States, South Korea, and Japan (although all three countries are also exploring sub-6 to various degrees). U.S. carriers are primarily focused on mmWave deployment for 5G because most of the 3 and 4 GHz spectrum being used by the rest of the world for 5G are exclusive Federal bands in the United States, extensively used by DoD in particular.

  The question of spectrum allocation is at the heart of the 5G competition, for the spectrum band of choice, whether sub-6 or mmWave, impacts nearly every other aspect of 5G development. Spectrum bands in the 3 and 4 Ghz range dominate global 5G activity because of improved propagation (range) over mmWave spectrum, resulting in far fewer base stations needed to be deployed to deliver the same coverage and performance. Because large swaths of the sub-6 bands in the United States are not available for civil/commercial use, U.S. carriers and the FCC (which controls civil spectrum in the US) are betting on mmWave spectrum as the core domestic 5G approach.

  U.S. carriers may continue to pursue mmWave, but it is impossible to lead in the 5G field without followers. Leadership in wireless networks requires the global market to subscribe to

  and build to the specifications of the leader’s spectrum bands of choice, as these 5G subcomponents and products will ultimately drive interoperability across networks. The rest of the world does not face the same sub-6 spectrum limitations as U.S. carriers, and is subsequently pursuing 5G development in that range. As a result, the United States may find itself without a global supply base if it continues to pursue a spectrum range divergent from the rest of the world.

  If the future 5G ecosystem adopted by most of the world is built on the sub-6 mid-band spectrum, the United States will also be faced with mmWave device interoperability challenges and sub-6 infrastructure security concerns. As sub-6 becomes the global standard, it is likely that China, the current leader in that space, will lead the charge. This would create security risks for DoD operations overseas that rely on networks with Chinese components in the supply chain. Even if the United States were to restrict use of Chinese equipment suppliers domestically, the United States is not a big enough market in wireless to prevent China’s 5G suppliers from continuing to increase market share globally, resulting in significant pressure on a declining set of vendors that would serve the U.S. market. These vendors will in turn be unable to invest R&D towards future 5G offerings due to decreasing market share, limiting the number of competitive products and depriving DoD and U.S. industries of better and cheaper global supply chains.

  China plans to deploy the first widespread 5G network, with its first set of sub-6 services becoming available in 2020. First-mover advantage will likely drive significant increases in their handset and telecom equipment vendors market along with their domestic semiconductor and system suppliers. As a result, Chinese internet companies will be well-positioned to develop services and applications for their home market that take advantage of 5G speed and low latency. As 5G is deployed across the globe in similar bands of spectrum, China’s handset and internet applications and services are likely to become dominant, even if they are excluded from the US. China is on a track to repeat in 5G what happened with the United States in 4G.

  CHAPTER 1: 5G HISTORY AND OVERVIEW

  A History of Generation Technology

  Mobile wireless technology has been in development for decades, with the first generation (1G) introduced in the late 1970s and fielded in the early 1980s. Since then, new generations of technology and wireless standards have been introduced every decade or so, culminating in our present state of transition between 4G and 5G capabilities. The value of each generation has increased exponentially, as each has enabled a host of other technology advancements across the commercial sector and military. All existing generations work within the low- to mid-band spectrum (less than 6GHz, or sub-6), but 5G has opened the door for millimeter wave (mmWave) spectrum use as well.

  Source: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Wireless-technology-evolution_fig1_322584266

  1G (Voice Calls): 1G mobile networks were fielded in the early 1980s with voice communications and limited emphasis on data transfer capability (early capability ~2.4 Kbps). 1G networks utilized analog signals to “hand off” cell users between a network of distributed base stations (hosted on cell towers) using standards like AMPS and TACS.

  2G (Messaging): In the 1990s, 2G mobile networks spawned the first digitally-encrypted telecommunications that improved voice quality, data security, and data capacity, while hosting limited data capability by way of circuit-switching using the GSM standard. In the late 1990s,

  2.5G and 2.75G technology brought about improved data rates (upwards of 200 Kbps) using GPRS and EDGE standards, respectively. These later 2G iterations introduced data transmission via packet-switching, which served as a stepping-stone to 3G technology.

  3G (Limited data: multimedia, text, internet): The late 1990s and early 2000s introduced 3G networks with faster data transfer speeds by fully transitioning to data packet-switching, with some voice circuit-switching that had been standard for 2G. This enabled data streaming, and in 2003 the first commercial 3G service was launched with mobile internet access, fixed wireless access, and video calls. 3G networks have now increased data speeds to 1Gbps when stationary and upwards of 350Kbps when mobile, using standards such as UMTS and WCDMA.

  4G and LTE (True data: dynamic information access, variable devices): 4G network services were introduced in 2008 and featured data transfer at 10 times the speed of 3G by leveraging all-IP networks and relying entirely on packet-switching. 4G networks enhanced the quality of video data due to larger bandwidths allowing for increased network speed. The introduction of the LTE network has since set the standard for high-speed wireless communications on mobile devices and data terminals. LTE is in constant evolution, and is currently on release number 12. “LTE advanced” can support ~300 Mbps.

  5G: 5G’s precise capabilities and extent of adoption are still to be determined. The speed, volume, and latency of data transfer will depend on the spectrum bands used, as well as the context of network usage (fixed or mobile). For example, a mmWave 5G network could enable incredibly fast speed for fixed local area networks under specific conditions that did not limit wave propagation, but would conversely struggle to maintain those speeds at extended range (on the “cell edge”). A sub-6 5G network might have lower maximum speed than mmWave, but could cover a much broader area without risk of interruption from a range of environmental factors. These conditions will ultimately determine the “standards” for 5G, and are currently in development globally.

  History’s Lessons: First-Mover Advantage in Generation Transitions

  Transitions between wireless technology generations before 5G also had substantial commercial, competitive, and security implications for first-movers. Europe, led by Germany, gained first competitive advantage in 2G, and as a result companies like Nokia and Ericsson were able to roll out more advanced devices earlier and were already transitioning to 3G in the 2000s when the United States was still trying to implement 2G. The European wireless tech industry boomed during this period while U.S. companies struggled to keep pace. Europe lost this edge during the 3G transition, when they were hampered by regulations that required time-consuming auctions of 3G spectrum, rather than simply repurposing existing 2G spectrum bandwidth. Japan took the lead on 3G, and while the United States ultimately caught up to Japan, it took years to roll out 3G networks, which came at a huge cost to U.S. businesses as Japan sprinted forward with its 3G business model. The United States lost thousands of jobs and considerable revenue during this transition, during which multiple wireless technology companies failed or were absorbed into foreign companies.

  The United States learned from its previous mistakes when it came to 4G and 4G LTE. Although it had been slow to implement 3G, there was a surge in 3G investment in the later years that ultimately gave the United States a head start when 4G arrived. Additionally, the FCC opened licenses for more bandwidth and set regulations to promote rapid expansion of the 4G network as it was being developed. Japan kept pace at first, but Japanese industry failed move quickly to develop the technology that would ultimately shape the 4G ecosystem. As a result, the United States took an early lead in the smart device market and ultimately displaced Japanese operating systems both in and out of Japan.

  In the early 2010s, AT&T and Verizon rapidly deployed LTE across the United States in the 700 MHz spectrum they won at auction in 2008. The United States became the first country (after Finland) to see a comprehensive LTE network that delivered approximately 10x the consumer network performance of existing 3G networks. This step-change in performance drove rapid

  adoption of new handsets with new semiconductors that not only could move much more data, but were computationally much faster as well. U.S. companies like Apple, Google, Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, and countless others built new applications and services that took advantage of that bandwidth and those new handset capabilities. As LTE was deployed in other countries, those same handsets and applications spread across the world, driving U.S. dominance in global wireless and internet services.

  The United States has benefited significantly from this lead. Recon Analytics published a report in April 20181 estimating that the introduction of 4G contributed to 70% growth in the wireless industry between 2011 and 2014, bolstering GDP while increasing jobs in the wireless industry by over 80%. By leading the charge on 4G, the United States was able to build a global ecosystem of network providers, device manufacturers, and app developers that shaped the future of 4G and the experience of all other countries implementing it.

  1 “How America’s Leading Position In 4G Propelled the Economy,” Recon Analytics, 16 April 2018, https://api.ctia.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Recon-Analytics_How-Americas-4G-Leadership-Propelled-US-Economy_2018.pdf.

  2 Susan Crawford, “China Will Likely Corner the 5G Market - And the US Has No Plan,” Wired, 20 February 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/china-will-likely-corner-5g-market-us-no-plan/.

  First-mover advantage is particularly pronounced in wireless generation transitions because the leader can set the foundational infrastructure and specifications for all future products. For example, China is in the process of laying down fiber optic cables in its own territory and plans to do the same for the countries participating in its Belt and Road initiative, in addition to building 5G networks throughout Europe. This will allow China to selectively grant access to certain 5G companies and products to ride on that infrastructure.2 China is using this opportunity to promote sub-6 spectrum usage, which will shape the entire 5G product market going forward. If companies want to sell their 5G products into China or into any network with Chinese sponsorship, they will have to build to Chinese preferred specifications and partner with Chinese companies. This increases the risk of product backdoors and vulnerabilities throughout the supply chain.

  The shift to 5G will carry the same potential risks and rewards as previous generational transitions, but at an even larger scale. The leader of 5G stands to gain hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue over the next decade, with widespread job creation across the wireless technology sector. 5G has the potential to revolutionize other industries as well, as technologies like autonomous vehicles will gain huge benefits from the faster, larger data transfer. 5G will also enhance the Internet of Things (IoT) by increasing the amount and speed of data flowing between multiple devices, and may even replace the fiber-optic backbone relied upon by so many households. The country that owns 5G will own many of these innovations and set the standards for the rest of the world.

  For the reasons that follow, that country is currently not likely to be the United States.

  Spectrum Use and Options

  Spectrum use and availability are the most important factors in fielding a viable 5G network, as they will determine the speed, volume, and latency of data transfer going forward. 4G data transfer capabilities cannot keep pace with current demand, and the 5G step-change would address the increasing rate of data consumption by fielding a functioning 5G network using mmWave bands, sub-6 bands, or both. The following sections describe the relative strengths and weaknesses of mmWave and sub-6 approaches, as well as their potential applications and roles in a future 5G ecosystem.

  Millimeter Wave (mmWave)

  MmWave spectrum operates in high frequencies found between 30 GHz and 300 GHz, and is attractive for a number of reasons. First, the shorter wavelengths of mmWave create narrower beams, which in turn provide better resolution and security for the data transmission and can carry large amounts of data at increased speeds with minimal latency. Second, there is more mmWave bandwidth available, which improves data transfer speed and avoids the congestion that exists in lower spectrum bands (prior to researching potential 5G uses of mmWave frequencies, the only major operators in that area of the spectrum were radar and satellite traffic). A 5G mmWave ecosystem would require a significant infrastructure build, but could reap the benefits of data transferred at up to 20x the speed of current 4G LTE networks. Finally, mmWave components are smaller than components for lower bands of the spectrum, allowing for more compact deployment on wireless devices. Outside of its physical properties, MmWave is also attractive to U.S. 5G developers because the U.S. government owns large swaths of the sub-6 spectrum, particularly in the 3 and 4 GHz range, making it difficult for carriers to purchase dedicated spectrum licenses at FCC auctions or even to share that part of the spectrum.

  However, mmWave has its share of challenges. While its short wavelengths and narrowness of its beam allow for improved resolution and security of data transfer, these qualities can also restrict the distance at which mmWaves can propagate. This creates a high infrastructure cost, as a mmWave network would require densely populated base stations throughout a geographic area to ensure uninterrupted connectivity. This challenge is further aggravated by the fact that mmWaves can be easily blocked by obstacles like walls, foliage, and the human body itself. MmWave spectrum can achieve extended range in specific circumstances, such as in large buildings with flat reflective windows above the tree line, but few environments in the United States are conducive to this type of propagation.

  Various studies have begun to test the efficacy of mmWave and sub-6 infrastructure builds in the United States. MoffettNathanson LLC recently conducted an analysis of Verizon’s 5G mmWave efforts in Sacramento and discovered that after roughly six months in the market, Verizon’s ~150 fixed wireless broadband (FWBB) base stations can only offer service to around 6% of residential addresses in the tested areas.3 Verizon has been targeting particularly dense

  3 Craig Moffet, Ray McDonough and Jessica Moffet, “Fixed Wireless Broadband: A Peek Behind the Curtain of Verizon’s 5G Rollout,” p. 7, MoffetNathanson, March 20, 2019, https://www.moffettnathanson.com/?Section=Media%20/Telecom.

  parts of Sacramento as optimal testing environments and is focused on developing a fixed network, which carries fewer challenges for mmWave deployment than a mobile network. However, even in these optimized circumstances it is clear that scaling this solution to provide more coverage would be a time- and cost-intensive endeavor requiring a massive infrastructure build-out.

  Google also performed a preliminary study for the Defense Innovation Board to ascertain the approximate capital expenditure (capex) and base station counts needed for mmWave deployments, using 425 MHz of spectrum at 28 GHz (a mmWave configuration standard for current U.S. 5G trials), compared to 250 MHz of spectrum in the 3.4 GHz band (a sub-6 configuration, standard for Chinese 5G trials and deployment). This equipment was deployed on 72,735 existing macrocell towers and rooftops (the easiest choice for deployment) and was found to provide mmWave coverage to only 11.6% of the U.S. population at cell edge speeds of 100 Mbps, with 3.9% coverage at 1 gigabit. For sub-6, the same tower sites covered 57.4% of the population at 100 Mbps, and 21.2% of the population at 1 Gbps. The study used high- resolution geospatial data that included shadowing from foliage structures, but did not take into account shadowing from the human body or a vehicle, which realistically would exist in a deployed environment and even further disrupt connectivity for mmWave networks.

  Most operators are looking at deploying mmWave 5G sites on utility poles, given the poles’ ease of accessibility and abundance. Using a database of utility poles in the United States, the study indicated that it would require approximately 13 million pole-mounted 28-GHz base stations and $400B dollars in capex to deliver 100 Mbps edge rate at 28 GHz to 72% of the U.S. population, and up to 1 Gbps to approximately 55% of the U.S. population. Figures 1 and 2 below show the difference in “splat” (propagation) between 28 GHz (mmWave) and 3.4 Ghz (sub-6) deployments on the same pole height in a relatively flat part of Los Angeles (blue represents 100 Mbps speed, red represents 1 Gbps speed):

  Figure 1: “Splat” chart with mmWave propagation Figure 2: “Splat” chart with sub-6 propagation

  There are ongoing efforts to mitigate these physics challenges, such as massive MIMO (multiple-input, multiple-output) and beamforming. Massive MIMO is an antenna array that will greatly expand the number of simultaneous connections and throughput, and will give base stations the ability to send and receive signals from many more users at once and increase the capacity of networks significantly, assuming multiple RF paths to users exist. Beamforming is a technique for identifying the most efficient data-delivery route to a particular user and reducing interference for nearby users in the process. These options can improve the propagation of mmWaves, but challenges remain with maintaining connectivity across a broader area using this part of the spectrum. Significant time and R&D will have to be devoted to solving the mmWave propagation problem before it can be deployed as a more universal wireless network solution.

  Sub-6

  Sub-6 includes the range of spectrum below 6 GHz. Sub-6 can provide broad area network coverage with lower risk of interruption than mmWave due to its longer wavelength and greater capacity to penetrate obstacles. It therefore requires less capex and fewer base stations, as compared to mmWave. This, together with the ability to leverage existing 4G infrastructure, makes sub-6 the lower hanging fruit for a potential 5G sub-6 ecosystem. Faster time-to-rollout is particularly important given the speed at which China is pushing forward. While mmWave may ultimately be deployed in specific environments where its propagation and cost challenges are not prohibitive, sub-6 will likely provide the broader solution for more wide area 5G coverage in the near term. This in turn will drive product design and manufacturing for the 5G supply chain, given the larger quantity of equipment that will feed that sub-6 network.

  Maximizing the potential of 5G requires hundreds of consecutive MHz of bandwidth in order to optimize performance, and the sub-6 spectrum is already crowded with existing systems and uses. In the United States, sub-6 5G technologies will likely be deployed in existing macrocell networks and infrastructure through existing LTE spectrum. This would give modest improvements to RF system performance, but would not yield a 10x performance improvement over modern versions of LTE operating in the same spectrum. This failure to deliver the same disruptive speed improvements that LTE had over 3G would mute the impact of 5G deployment in the United States.

  An additional challenge in the United States is that the government owns large portions of the sub-6 spectrum and limits commercial access to them. It is possible to relocate Federal users or share these bandwidths to allow commercial sector to develop 5G capabilities on them, but both of these processes are time-intensive. The average time it takes to “clear” spectrum (relocate existing users and systems to other parts of the spectrum) and then release it to the civil sector, either through auction, direct assignment, or other methods, is typically upwards of ~10 years. Sharing spectrum is a slightly faster process because it doesn’t require a complete upheaval of existing federal users, but even that has historically taken upwards of five years.

  There are also legitimate concerns within DoD that sharing its bandwidths in the sub-6 spectrum will create a number of operational issues, from spectrum optimization to security vulnerabilities.

  If DoD operators are forced to share their bands of the spectrum, there is concern that this may reduce the performance of systems. The addition of commercial users would also increase the overall congestion of the sub-6 spectrum, increasing the risk of connectivity interruptions for DoD operators. There is precedent for successful spectrum-sharing - in 2010, the FCC opened up the 3550-3700 MHz bandwidth (known as Citizens Broadband Radio Service, or CBRS) to the commercial sector. However, this process took more than five years, a timeframe that is untenable in the current competitive environment. This paper will explore the CBRS case study in more detail in Chapter 3.

  Given these benefits and challenges associated with mmWave and sub-6, the future of 5G may involve some combination of both. Sub-6 is optimized for broad area coverage, which will make up a large part of the network, but mmWave may ultimately be able to provide more exquisite coverage in specific scenarios, and has some distinct military advantages in some topographies by virtue of being harder to intercept. This will require further research and testing in the mmWave spectrum targeting the current physics challenges around propagation, which may in turn lower the capex required for mmWave infrastructure deployment. In the near term, 3 and 4 GHz spectrum will likely serve as the dominant global bands that drive volume in infrastructure and device deployments. In the current state of 5G development and spectrum usage, it is unlikely that the United States will be able to leverage such technology, much less lead the rest of the world in that band of spectrum deployment as it did with 4G almost a decade ago.

  CHAPTER 2: CURRENT STATE OF THE 5G COMPETITIVE FIELD

  5G capability by country can be compared across five metrics: spectrum availability, widespread 5G trials, 5G roadmaps being established by the national regulator, government commitment (e.g., strategy documents and policies paving the way for 5G implementation), and industry commitment to early 5G launch.4 Of these metrics, spectrum availability has the largest influence, as many of the other factors are dependent on that availability. For spectrum availability, there is ongoing debate on the merits of sub-6 versus mmWave and how to allocate spectrum in either of those categories, and in the United States there is a larger concern about allocating or sharing government-owned spectrum to the commercial sector. For infrastructure, carriers can take a “non-standalone” approach, which leverages existing 3G and 4G infrastructure as a stepping stone to get to full 5G capability, or a “standalone” approach, which requires a large up-front investment to build out new infrastructure for a 5G network.

  4 David Abecassis, Chris Nickerson and Janette Stewart, “Global Race to 5G - Spectrum and Infrastructure Plans and Priorities,” Analysys Mason, April 2018, https://api.ctia.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Analysys-Mason-Global-Race-To-5G_2018.pdf.

  5 Edison Lee and Timothy Chau, “Telecom Services: The Geopolitics of 5G and IoT,” Jefferies, September 14, 2017, https://www.jefferies.com/CMSFiles/Jefferies.com/files/Insights/TelecomServ.pdf.

  Source: https://www.everythingrf.com/community/5g-frequency-bands

  China

  China has taken the lead in 5G development through a series of aggressive investment and spectrum-allocation initiatives. In addition to investing $180B in capital expenditure for 5G deployment over five years, China assigned 200 MHz of mid-band spectrum to its three state providers and is considering reallocating 500 MHz of C-band spectrum as well.5 Domestically, China’s 5G deployment is being implemented through its major telecommunications companies

  (China Mobile, China Unicom, and China Telecom). All three are primarily focused on developing a standalone 5G network in China, with plans to deploy pre-commercial application in 2019 and formal commercial application in 2020. China now has ~350,000 5G-operable base stations deployed, which is nearly 10 times as many as are deployed in the United States. Globally, China’s large manufacturers (Huawei and ZTE) are pushing 5G deployment through commercial sales of 5G-enabling equipment and devices primarily for non-standalone networks, and Huawei has already shipped upwards of 10,000 base stations overseas.6

  6 Isao Horikoshi and Takashi Kawakami, “Telecom’s 5G revolution triggers shakeup in base station market,” Nikkei Asian Review, December 25, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Technology/Telecom-s-5G-revolution-triggers-shakeup-in-base-station-market.

  7 Stéphane Téral, “Mobile Infrastructure Market Tracker - Regional,” IHS Markit, December 3, 2018, https://technology.ihs.com/597909/mobile-infrastructure-market-tracker-regional-q3-2018.

  Overseas, China has been developing partnerships with countries and foreign companies to expand its 5G influence. In Europe, Huawei and ZTE are offering their services to build individual countries’ 5G networks, and have signed multiple 5G contracts despite pressure from U.S. officials demanding that allies block Chinese companies. Additionally, China has invested significant time and resources into its Belt and Road Initiative, including a push for Chinese-built network infrastructure to provide connectivity across the length of the route. This strategy has already had some success: in Q3 of 2018, Huawei held 28% share of the global telecommunications equipment market, up four percentage points from 2015.7 Huawei is expected to continue growing that share as more 5G networks are rolled out relying on Chinese telecommunications equipment. These efforts will allow China to promote its preferred standards and specifications for 5G networks and will shape the global 5G product market going forward.

  In aggregate, these approaches have given competitive advantage to China in 5G technology and capability. China’s 5G strategy should be viewed in the context of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) grand strategy. Like artificial intelligence (AI), 5G development is a crucial component of Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” vision and “Made in China 2025” roadmap. Social stability and economic growth are the CCP’s top priorities because failures in those two areas are seen as direct existential threats to the regime, and 5G has the potential to transition China from a capital- and labor-intensive manufacturing economy to an innovation-led, consumption-driven economy with reduced dependence on foreign investment. In light of China’s slowing growth and its ongoing trade war with the United States, the CCP likely feels pressured to pursue technological advancement initiatives like 5G more aggressively.

  *For more detail on China’s 5G strategy and capabilities, please see Classified Annex.

  South Korea

  South Korea is closely following China in 5G maturity due to its early auction of spectrum and its general commitment to wireless technology. The South Korean government has built a clear roadmap including healthy investment to pursue 5G; in 2014, South Korea committed $1.5B to promote 5G adoption and deployment by 2020, and in 2017, South Korea released its national broadband and spectrum plan (“K-ICT”) to further promote 5G.8 In line with the K-ICT plan, South Korea’s Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT) has since auctioned over 1,000 MHz of spectrum in the sub-6 and mmWave ranges to its three largest telecommunications providers (SK Telecom, KT Corp, and LG Uplus). South Korea has closely partnered with AT&T and Verizon to develop 5G mmWave networks, but has spread its risk in pursuing both sub-6 and mmWave by making its devices functional in both parts of the spectrum (as in the case of its Exynos 5100 5G modem).9 AT&T is also working with Samsung to release a cell phone with mmWave and sub-6 capabilities at the end of 2019, but these dual-function devices may have less capability in the United States, given the restricted range of sub-6 spectrum available.

  8 Lee Kangwook, “South Korean Government to Introduce K-ICT Spectrum Plan,” December 23, 2016, //www.ipnomics.net/?p=16629.

  9 Sean Kinney, “5G modem based on 3GPP Rel. 15, Samsung says,” RCRWireless News, August 15, 2018, https://www.rcrwireless.com/20180815/5g/samsung-5g-modem-supports-sub-6-ghz-and-millimeter-wave-frequencies.

  10 Kohei Satoh, “Remarks by the 5GMF Secretary General,” 5GMF, July 4, 2016, https://5gmf.jp/en/committee/20160704154530/.

  11 Kunko Ogawa, “Radio Policy to Realize 5G in 2020,” Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (MIC), June 28, 2016, https://www.gsma.com/spectrum/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/MIC_Spectrum-for-5G-MIC-Kuniko-OGAWA.pdf.

  South Korea was able to leverage the 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang to showcase its 5G investment and conduct various network trials. South Korean industry already promotes high-intensity competition for 4G and LTE network technologies, which will fuel further rapid development of 5G. SK Telecom currently leads the field in investment and 5G trials, and was also able to acquire the largest amount of spectrum bandwidth in the 2018 MSIT auction, but all three telecoms providers plan to synchronize their launches of 5G cellular service in early 2019 for “Korea 5G Day.” South Korea is well-positioned in the 5G field and will likely continue to be a leader going forward as its major telecoms providers take advantage of their newly-auctioned spectrum bandwidth.

  Japan

  Japan is following closely behind China, South Korea, and the United States in 5G capability. Japan has not yet auctioned off key parts of its spectrum bandwidth to commercial providers, but has plans to do so in 2019 and is currently developing both mmWave and sub-6 options (mmWave is being applied to limited, densely-populated geographic areas, while sub-6 is being used to cover the rest of the territory). Similar to South Korea, Japan hopes to use the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo to showcase and test 5G technologies and networks, and is driving most of its investment and activity around that 2020 timeline. In 2014, Japan stood up its 5G Mobile Forum (5GMF) to promote 5G research and development, coordinate 5G efforts across organizations, and promote general awareness of 5G.10 In 2016, Japan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (MIC) released a strategy document (“Radio Policy to Realize 5G in 2020”) that mapped out its commitment to and future deployment of 5G.11

  Japan’s three major telecoms providers (NTT DOCOMO, KDDI, and Softbank) are all in the process of testing 5G technologies with the intention of launching in 2020 before the Olympics. All three companies are conducting trials in the sub-6 and mmWave ranges, and MIC has conducted a “5G System Trial” in Tokyo and rural Japan.

  Rest of World (Non-US)

  While China, South Korea, the United States, and Japan lead the field, the rest of the world is playing catch-up on 5G deployment. The United Kingdom, Germany, and France can be considered “second tier” 5G developers, while Singapore, Russia, and Canada make up the “third tier,” and the rest of the world comes after. These countries are beginning to auction off spectrum bandwidth with varying timelines and volume of spectrum made available, but many lack any formal policies or strategies to enable 5G implementation and most anticipate 5G launches outside of the 2020 timeframe.

  Although Europe led the charge into 2G, it has since been hampered by regulations that have limited its ability to rapidly make spectrum bandwidth available, and has continued to lag behind in 3G, 4G, and now 5G. The rest of Asia has made some strides in 5G, but few countries have invested the same time and resources as China, Japan, and South Korea. Russia released its “Digital Economy of the Russian Federation” in 2017 that included a 5G roadmap, but has yet to develop any clear spectrum plan or devote significant resources to that roadmap.12 Russia used the 2018 FIFA World Cup to launch some of its 5G efforts, but is still highly reliant on foreign 5G technologies and partnerships to move its 5G development forward.

  12 “The Digital Economy of the Russian Federation,” accessed March 20, 2019, //ac.gov.ru/en/projects/014097.html.

  13 Article 14: “State intelligence work organs, when legally carrying forth intelligence work, may demand that concerned organs, organizations, or citizens provide needed support, assistance, and cooperation”;

  Article 17: “As necessary for their work, the staff of national intelligence work institutions may, in accordance with relevant national provisions, have priority use of, or lawfully requisition, state organs', organizations' or individuals' transportation or communications tools, premises and buildings.” China’s National Intelligence Law, June 27, 2017.

  Given the gap in 5G advancement between the first tier and everyone else, the rest of the world will likely be driven to implement the 5G network design and infrastructure of whichever country leads 5G. China is the current leader, and U.S. allies have taken different stances on how to respond to the Chinese drive to set 5G standards. Some are wary of Chinese influence because of security concerns and are actively working to push back on China’s 5G roll-out. For example, in December the Czech Republic’s cybersecurity agency (NUKIB) issued an official warning that Huawei and other Chinese companies posed a national security risk, citing existing Chinese statutes (National Intelligence Law, enacted June 27, 2017)13 that require Chinese companies to actively cooperate with the intelligence community. This has driven a security review throughout Czech public and private sectors, effectively halting all sales of Huawei 5G goods into the country. Australia and Poland have also taken a hard line against China, and the United States has been heavily pressuring its other allies to follow suit.

  However, other countries have been less enthusiastic about ousting China from their 5G markets, given the price and quality of China’s offerings. Germany has refused to ban Huawei, despite U.S. threats to cut off intelligence-sharing, and the United Kingdom appears likely to take the same approach. Both Germany and the United Kingdom have pushed back on U.S. claims that Huawei and other Chinese telecommunications companies represent an unacceptable risk to national security, claiming that their security organizations could take measures to limit vulnerabilities in their networks. India and Italy have also expressed their hesitancy to exclude Huawei products from their 5G roll-outs, and in recent months New Zealand has eased its initial hard stance against China. In the coming months, Europe will continue to be a battleground for the future of 5G, as it represents one of Huawei’s largest markets as well as a major source of U.S. allies. This fight also suggests a more concerning trajectory for the rest of the world’s approach to 5G - in particular, developing countries that are more sensitive to cost will find the Chinese 5G price-point difficult to turn down, especially when the offer is sweetened with infrastructure and project-financing incentives like the Belt and Road Initiative.

  United States

  Private Sector

  The telecommunications industry is organizing the effort to develop and deploy 5G in the United States, with increasing support from the U.S. government. Verizon, AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile are all developing their own 5G networks and 5G devices, each with their own strategy and method. Verizon and AT&T are focused on developing high-band mmWave networks and are in the process of deploying small cells in various test cities for mobile and fixed applications, Sprint is taking a joint approach of mmWave and mid-band spectrum to build out its network, and T-Mobile is focused on mmWave and low-band spectrum. While all carriers are looking into sub-6 spectrum options to some extent, they are inherently restricted by smaller amount of bandwidth available in sub-6 relative to the hundreds of GHz available in mmWave, and this constraint is exacerbated by the fact that the U.S. government owns large portions of the sub-6 spectrum. Carriers are piggy-backing off of existing 4G infrastructure, but those focused on mmWave will have to build out additional infrastructure to ensure uninterrupted connectivity through a dense network of base stations. There is debate over whether some of the networks deployed have qualified as true 5G, and there is intense competition between these providers to roll out 5G networks within the next few years. 5G development is being overseen by 3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project), the standards body that also oversaw the development of 3G UMTS (including HSPA) and 4G LTE standards.

  Despite messaging from various marketing initiatives in the United States, very little U.S. territory has seen deployment of 5G infrastructure that can deliver 1 Gbps or even 100 Mbps service at the edges of coverage. Whereas LTE deployment resulted in 10x end user speed improvement across large parts of the United States, carriers to date have not demonstrated deployment capability that would deliver high speeds to large parts of the U.S. population.

  As discussed in Chapter One, U.S. carriers have had some success in deploying limited mmWave for small geographic areas, but these have limitations for future scalability. Even in optimized circumstances, it is clear that scaling mmWave to provide more coverage would be a time- and cost-intensive endeavor requiring a massive infrastructure build-out.

  There is the risk that these carriers will not even be able to commit the necessary capex to scale those mmWave networks, given the large number of base stations required. At the end of 2018, Verizon held ~$120B in debt with ~4% dividend yields, while AT&T held ~$175B in debt with over 6% dividend yields.14 T-Mobile holds ~$25B in debt, and Sprint holds ~$40B in debt.15 These companies are at the forefront of the U.S. effort to develop 5G, but their balance sheets suggest that they may struggle with the cost of a full mmWave network roll-out and the infrastructure it would require.

  14 “Schedule of Outstanding Debt,” Verizon, accessed March 20, 2019, https://www.verizon.com/about/investors/schedule-outstanding-debt; “Debt Detail as of December 31, 2018,” AT&T, accessed March 20, 2019, https://investors.att.com/~/media/Files/A/ATT-IR/financial-reports/debt/2018/4q18/Debt_List_4Q18.pdf.

  15 “T-Mobile Outstanding Senior Notes And Credit Facilities – Ratings And Maturity Dates (By Year),” T-Mobile, accessed March 20, 2019, https://investor.t-mobile.com/financial-performance/fixed-income/default.aspx; “Q3 News Release,” Sprint, accessed March 20, 2019, https://s21.q4cdn.com/487940486/files/doc_financials/quarterly/2018/Q3/01_Fiscal-3Q18-Earnings-Release-FINAL.pdf.

  16 “Ericsson Revenue,” Macrotrends, accessed May 31, 2019, https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/ERIC/ericsson/revenue.

  17 “Nokia Revenue,” Macrotrends, accessed May 31, 2019, https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/NOK/nokia/revenue.

  18 “Just 2 Companies Control 50% of India’s Smartphone Market,” The Economic Times, February 15, 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/hardware/just-2-companies-control-50-of-indias-smartphone-market/articleshow/68007602.cms?from=mdr.

  In the last decade, significant shifts have occurred in the wireless vendor community as well. Chinese telecom equipment giant Huawei grew global revenues from approximately $28B in 2009 to $107B in 2018. Ericsson's revenue during the same period fell from $27.9B to $23.9B,16 while Nokia’s revenue fell from $57.6B to $26.6B.17 Chinese handset vendors like Huawei, ZTE, Xiaomi, Vivo, and Oppo have grown market share from less than approximately 6% in 2009 to over 30% share in 2018, and are still growing rapidly despite minimal sales in the U.S. market - for example, India represents a wireless market larger than that of the United States, and 59.7% of all handsets sold in India are Chinese.18 Chinese internet application companies, led by Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent and new companies like TikTock are growing in influence and revenue. In 2009, all of the top 10 Internet companies by revenue were American. Today, four of the top 10 are Chinese.

  These shifts have not just occurred because Chinese equipment is cheaper. In many cases, Chinese equipment is also superior to its Western rivals. Huawei and ZTE have been the leader in massive MIMO radio systems, with 64 transmit and receive elements. Many consider Huawei’s P series and Mate Android phones the most advanced phones in the world, and these devices are powered by Huawei’s own Hi-silicon division. Alibaba’s cloud services are fourth in the world, behind Amazon, Microsoft, and Google, and growing quickly.

  Public Sector: White House

  U.S. government interest in 5G has been ramping up over the last decade. In 2016, the White House launched a $400 million Advanced Wireless Research Initiative to promote wireless testing platforms, while the FCC passed its “Spectrum Frontiers” policy in which the United States committed to releasing large quantities of mmWave spectrum for both licensed and unlicensed use.19 Interest in 5G has increased under the current administration, which has offered up a series of initiatives and directives emphasizing the importance of 5G and to develop a clear roadmap. The current administration supports a private sector-led 5G effort, rather than a government-led nationalized 5G plan.

  19 The White House, “Fact Sheet: Administration Announces an Advanced Wireless Research Initiative, Building on President’s Legacy of Forward-Leaning Broadband Policy,” 15 July 2016. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/15/fact-sheet-administration-announces-advanced-wireless-research; Harper Neidig, “White House orders Commerce to develop 5G strategy,” The Hill, 25 October 2018, https://thehill.com/policy/technology/413121-white-house-orders-commerce-to-develop-5g-strategy.

  20 “Presidential Memorandum on Developing a Sustainable Spectrum Strategy for America’s Future,” White House, October 25, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-developing-sustainable-spectrum-strategy-americas-future/.

  21 Michael Kratsios, “America Will Win the Global Race to 5G,” White House Office of Science & Technology, October 25, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/america-will-win-global-race-5g/.

  In September 2018, the White House hosted a 5G Summit, during which industry and government leaders convened to discuss the future direction of 5G, promoting private-public sector collaboration while conceding that the United States had fallen behind in developing and fielding 5G. Shortly after, the White House released the “Presidential Memorandum on Developing a Sustainable Spectrum Strategy for America’s Future,” highlighting the need for the United States to lead 5G to promote national security and innovation across the public and private sectors.20 The memo directed departments and agencies to submit a number of reports on current spectrum usage and future requirements, spectrum reallocation options, and the impact of future technologies on spectrum allocation, and also called for 5G legislative, regulatory, and policy recommendations. On the same day as the Presidential memo, the White House released an article titled “America Will Win the Global Race to 5G”, looking at U.S. advantages gained from leading 4G (e.g., increased GDP and job opportunities) and comparing them to the potential benefits of leading 5G.21

  Public Sector: FCC

  The FCC plays a large role in the development and fielding of 5G with regard to spectrum allocation and policy for civil-use spectrum. In late 2018, the FCC held a vote to establish a framework for freeing up mmWave spectrum bandwidth to help expedite 5G development and deployment. The FCC controls U.S. spectrum auctions and held its first 5G spectrum auction in late 2018, which opened up the 28 GHz band. A second auction, held on March 14, 2019, made available the 24 GHz band.

  The FCC released its comprehensive 5G strategy, “Facilitate America’s Superiority in 5G Technology (FAST) Plan,” in September of 2018.22 The plan focuses on three main goals: pushing more spectrum into the marketplace, updating infrastructure policy, and modernizing outdated regulations to facilitate 5G in the United States. With regard to the spectrum goal, the FCC plans to hold three more auctions in 2019 to sell bands of mmWave spectrum, and is conducting research to understand options for opening up low- and mid-band spectrum. With regard to the infrastructure goal, the FCC is working to increase the speed of review for small cells at the federal, state, and local levels to facilitate faster fielding of 5G. With regard to the modernization goal, the FCC is focused on adjusting existing regulations and making new ones to support 5G deployment, such as updating its rules on network equipment to allow for more rapid cell fielding and preventing the sale of network equipment from companies that pose a national security threat to U.S. networks.

  22 “The FCC’s FAST Plan,” FCC, accessed March 20, 2019, https://www.fcc.gov/5G.

  23 “FCC Expands Flexible Use of Mid-band Spectrum,” FCC, July 13, 2018,

  https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-expands-flexible-use-mid-band-spectrum.

  24 Neidig, “White House orders Commerce to develop 5G strategy.”

  The FCC has also started a proceeding to enable more flexible use of the 500 MHz of C-band downlink spectrum, which is positioned in the middle of the 3 and 4 GHz bands.23 In 2015 at ITU’s World Radio Conference, the Obama administration opposed the proposal to reclassify this band as an IMT-2000 allocation suitable for 5G use, which would have paved the way for global standardization of this spectrum for 5G mobility services. Even if the spectrum was reclassified as broadband, it would take some time before existing users could be completely removed from the C band. Sharing the band for 5G mobility use is difficult because mobile handsets emit radio energy in a broad pattern, and numbers of users operating near C band antenna could materially cause interference to satellite reception. However, fixed operations could share the spectrum through the use of highly directional antennas or beamforming systems, and this type of equipment would be ideal for providing fixed services to rural areas, as well as possible DoD uses for fixed network extensions.

  If the United States were to aggressively pursue sharing and eventual reallocation of the C-band downlink spectrum, it could allow a second round of 5G spectrum expansion that could give the United States a boost in speed and coverage. However, the benefits of this spectrum reallocation would depend on global companies building their devices to operate within C-band, and the United States would need to push for acceptance of that part of the spectrum as a globally utilized band.

  Public Sector: Department of Commerce

  The Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) manages federal-use spectrum allocation. The Department of Commerce is currently developing a “National Spectrum Strategy” to improve spectrum management, identify research and development priorities to create new technologies, and aggregate federal agencies’ spectrum operational needs.24 NTIA will work with members of a new Spectrum Strategy Task Force (established by the Presidential memo) in a multiyear effort to develop and implement this

  national strategy and align research, development, testing, and evaluation efforts.25 If DoD were to share its spectrum, it would have to work closely with NTIA to manage that sharing process.

  25 McCabe, “White House directs task force to come up with 5G wireless strategy,” Axios, October 25, 2018, https://www.axios.com/white-house-national-wireless-strategy-task-force-5g-5e884590-8a4b-4b12-9c16-a1b6401f84ad.html.

  CHAPTER 3: DoD DEVELOPMENT AND ADOPTION OF 5G TECHNOLOGY

  5G Impact on DoD

  While much of the discussion around 5G revolves around the commercial sector as the driving force behind its rollout, 5G ecosystems of technology can equally revolutionize DoD operations, networks, and information processes. DoD must be able to communicate, engage, and operate faster to keep up with the changing environment. 5G will enable this new concept of operations, allowing larger volumes of data to be shared in close to real time across geographically dispersed systems. Currently, data sharing at that scale cannot be completed effectively with legacy communication networks. Existing networks will benefit by leveraging lower latency and higher capacity data transfer capability, but 5G’s true potential will be in its impact on the battle network of the future. That network will increasingly include a large number of cheaper, more connected, and more resilient systems to function in a rapidly evolving battlefield.

  5G has the capability to combine DoD’s current fragmented networks into a single network to promote improved situational awareness and decision-making. This expanded reach will enable new technologies like hypersonic weapons and hypersonic defenses to be deployed, and has the potential to strengthen existing missions like nuclear C3. At an enterprise level, 5G can vastly improve day-to-day tasks such as logistics and maintenance, elevating the efficiency and speed of work across DoD.

  However, 5G also presents a serious potential risk for DoD going forward. When operating overseas in the future, the vast majority of these networks and systems may depend on 5G infrastructure. If China leads the field in 5G infrastructure and systems, then the future 5G ecosystem will likely have Chinese components embedded throughout. This would pose a serious threat to the security of DoD operations and networks going forward. Additionally, the growth in the number of connected devices increases the potential “attack surface” for adversaries to target across DoD networks, which will require increased vigilance and security across systems. The larger volume of data being transferred will complicate this task, as it will make it more difficult to detect malicious traffic on a network.

  Pivot to Sub-6 GHz

  The United States may choose to continue down the path of mmWave, but the rest of the world is focused on building out sub-6 infrastructure, with China in the lead. As a government entity that operates overseas, DoD will ultimately have to learn to operate on that sub-6 infrastructure, regardless of how the United States chooses to implement 5G domestically. For this reason, the United States must invest in sub-6 capabilities and take steps to share its spectrum. However, there are legitimate concerns within DoD that opening up sub-6 spectrum will create a number of operational issues, from spectrum optimization to security vulnerabilities. If DoD operators are forced to share their bands of the spectrum, there are concerns that this may temporarily or permanently reduce the performance of systems. The addition of commercial users would also increase the overall congestion of the sub-6 spectrum, increasing the risk of connectivity interruptions for DoD operators.

  However, if the United States and DoD do not pivot to sub-6, DoD will face further challenges with acquisition and practical deployment of 5G. Although mmWave components are typically more compact than sub-6 components, mmWave requires many more base stations positioned within close proximity of one another to maintain connection (and even then, there is still the risk that interference such as objects moving in front of the base station or weather will interrupt the connection). This quickly becomes logistically impractical if a person or platform has to carry multiple antennae, particularly at the fighting edge. Additionally, the DoD acquisition system is slow-moving and might take years to deploy the necessary systems for a mmWave network, at which point most of those systems might already be obsolete. Both DoD and the FCC are currently prioritizing mmWave over sub-6 mid-band spectrum with a particular focus on the 28 and 37 GHz bands, but this is a fundamentally flawed focus due to the impracticality of mmWave deployment. DoD must prepare to operate in a sub-6 5G ecosystem, which will require a shift in strategy and a consideration of where DoD is willing to share bandwidth in the sub-6 realm.

  This shift may come with some inherent benefits. The anonymity that comes from utilizing the same infrastructure as any other company or country provides an industry-standard form of security all its own. Integration of government and civil use may provide a layer of security by allowing military traffic to “hide in plain sight” as traffic becomes more difficult to see and isolate. Similarly, adversaries might be deterred from jamming this spectrum because they might be operating on the same bands. Government will maintain primary spectrum access while also benefiting from technology advancements from the commercial sector that result from operations in the sub-6 range, which will help the government to close the gap between the commercial sector and current state of military communications. This also creates an opportunity for cyber and communications personnel to learn how to make spectrum more resilient by working regularly with shared spectrum and managing it both domestically and abroad.

  A Path Forward for Sub-6 Spectrum Sharing

  The idea of spectrum sharing is not new. In 2010, the FCC identified the spectrum band from 3550-3700 MHz, known as Citizens Broadband Radio Service (CBRS), as a potential spectrum-sharing opportunity. CBRS utilizes LTE networks to provide wireless voice, text, and data services, and this spectrum was freed as a result of the FCC’s 2010 National Broadband Plan to provide more spectrum for new mobile users.26 In 2015, the FCC formally authorized the 3.5 GHz band for shared wireless access in an area that was previously utilized by the U.S. Navy and DoD. CBRS will enhance the “last mile” of fiber access to deliver fixed wireless service and also offer point-to-multipoint capabilities. CBRS spectrum can be unlicensed by the user, or they may purchase temporary licenses for periods of use, and it allows services to be deployed in a more rapid and efficient manner. DoD remains the incumbent user of the band, so other users will be limited by the Spectrum Access System (SAS), which ensures that there is deconfliction

  26 “National Broadband Plan,” FCC, March 17, 2010, https://www.fcc.gov/general/national-broadband-plan.

  to remove interference with military use. SAS gives DoD priority in the band, but keeps the band open for commercial users when not occupied.

  This precedent may serve as a guide for future spectrum sharing between DoD and the commercial sector. By offering up its own bandwidths to share, DoD can also encourage a system of “bi-directional” spectrum sharing in which civil and federal users could access one another’s spectrum with varying prioritization. This would increase the amount of spectrum available to DoD on a secondary level, while maintaining priority access in its own bandwidths. Additionally, DoD stands to gain significant benefits from 5G development, for reasons listed at the beginning of this chapter. DoD may have some initial growing pains as it begins to share parts of the spectrum, but the net gain in capability from 5G will ultimately make up for that inconvenience. If DoD does not begin to share the sub-6 spectrum, it will increase the risk of dependence on a compromised supply chain as U.S. companies will be blocked from developing and competing their own sub-6 5G offerings, and foreign providers will increasingly embed their offerings in networks and systems globally.

  Security Challenges in 5G

  Supply Chain Risks

  DoD is facing a future 5G environment where its supply chain will be increasingly vulnerable or compromised, from the subcomponent level to the integrated network level, as well as the services associated with each. In previous decades, DoD was able to operate on bespoke systems that fulfilled its unique requirements due to its position as a large user relative to the rest of the commercial world, but that privilege no longer exists. Commercial sector tech development and usage dwarfs that of DoD, and it is no longer practical for DoD to build and operate on siloed, bespoke systems and architecture. As a result, DoD is increasingly dependent on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment and commercial services, and the same will hold true for the future 5G ecosystem.

  DoD can incorporate commercial inputs into its 5G infrastructure at four levels: the RF component, the integrated chipset, the device, and the service. RF components can include subcomponents ranging from semiconductors to switches and amplifiers. Integrated chipsets combine various subcomponents and other subsystems to interface with system components on a motherboard. Devices can range from mobile handsets to fixed computer systems, which include both the subcomponents and integrated chipsets listed above. Finally, each of these inputs comes with a set of service offerings to operate, manage and maintain them.

  Commercial companies can supply any and all of the above inputs, but this comes with the risk of inadvertent or malicious security vulnerabilities that put DoD systems and networks at risk. The 5G ecosystem will especially run the risk of including security vulnerabilities if China becomes the global leader supplying 5G infrastructure from the subcomponent-level to the integrated system-level, for even if the United States limits sales of Chinese products into the United States, DoD will still have to operate on foreign networks overseas that will likely be built with a Chinese supply chain.

  DoD has made the shift from bespoke to commercial-reliant computing systems over the past decade, but this change in approach carried less risk than is currently faced because the United States dominated the computing systems market and was able to “own” the supply chain and better secure it against vulnerabilities. As a result, DoD now incorporates varying degrees of COTS products into its computing systems while keeping vulnerability risk at an acceptable level. However, in the current 5G competition, neither DoD nor the United States writ large is in a position to dictate the content and integration of the 5G supply chain - our focus on building a mmWave 5G ecosystem leaves us out of the global supply chain for the sub-6 5G ecosystem. This mismatch will create serious security risks for DoD going forward if the rest of the world accepts Chinese products as the cheaper and superior option for 5G.

  5G Infrastructure and Services

  5G networks have a number of security risks to consider, regardless of what spectrum bands they operate in. While DoD security typically focuses on vendor-installed backdoors that could be used to remotely control a system or exfiltrate information, a wide variety of security issues could also be introduced through poor software development practices both during and after the rollout of 5G. Many of these risks were mentioned in a UK report on the joint effort with Huawei and the UK government to manage security issues with Huawei deployments in the UK.27 Security issues from poor software development issues are a universal problem, and are not restricted to only Chinese vendors.

  27 “Huawei Cyber Security Official Oversight Board Annual Report 2019,” March 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/790270/HCSEC_OversightBoardReport-2019.pdf.

  Even if the security of a particular release of software for a 5G base station may be secure and well-implemented, there is no guarantee that future releases will continue to be equally secure. Bugs will inevitably be found and require software patches, and these fixes may need to be fielded quickly without fully considering new security issues that might be introduced with the patch. It will become increasingly challenging to validate continued security with each iteration.

  Even if base station code is secure and well-managed over time, the business model of the wireless infrastructure providers is such that personnel from the vendor are typically involved in the commissioning, operation, and maintenance of network infrastructure. This requires vendors to access core management systems that operate the network, and allows vendors to deploy software to equipment in the system. In many cases, network operators both in and out of the United States outsource entire operations of the network to the vendor of the equipment, increasing potential vulnerabilities via this third party activity.

  Field maintenance is also typically contracted back to the vendor. Service staff visiting field sites are able to upload new software to the network and change network configurations. DoD has a long history of combating malware that has been transmitted into weapons systems through computers that were not patched, did not have multi-factor authentication, or were exposed to security breaches through bad usage practices by personnel.28 All of these issues and more apply to vendor maintenance computers. These support systems are rarely examined by security engineers, and yet they may be equipped with credentials that give them powerful abilities to insert vulnerabilities into the infrastructure.

  28 “Weapon System Cybersecurity, GAO, October 2018, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/694913.pdf.

  29 Jerry Hildenbrand, “How does a phone maker ‘mistakenly’ collect user data and ship it off to a server in China?” androidcentral, March 23, 2019, https://www.androidcentral.com/how-does-company-nokia-or-oneplus-mistakenly-collect-user-data-and-ship-it-server-china.

  Radio access network (RAN) vendors often dictate choices of core network infrastructure that manages traffic over backhaul links and across national fiber networks. They also provide core authentication services, the ability to perform legal intercepts, name server functionality and interconnection with the Internet. This control derives from vendor use of non-standard techniques to communicate and manage base stations and the overall radio network. As a result, an operator may have difficulty choosing non-Huawei core infrastructure for Huawei base stations. Multi-vendor networks are typically configured as islands of common vendor equipment, and if a vendor is found to have serious security issues, replacing that vendor in the infrastructure may require a near-complete rebuilding of the network.

  5G core infrastructure has additional issues from functionalities like network “slicing” that exposes the network to non-operators. For example, if a virtual reality headset requires a managed slice of network infrastructure to communicate with a cloud-based gaming service, this increases the attack surface of the core network by enabling signaling and control to edge- and cloud-based compute entities.

  5G Devices

  In addition to 5G network infrastructure, DoD must also consider security risks associated with 5G devices. If the current trends of rising Chinese dominance in the wireless device market continues, Chinese vendors will continue to grow in market share and in sophistication, even if denied access to the U.S. market due to their device popularity with the rest of the world. To the extent U.S. forces deployed overseas use these devices, either for official business or for personal uses, DoD will have to address issues caused by their use.

  Evidence of backdoors or security vulnerabilities have been discovered in a variety of devices globally. Many of these seem to be related to requirements from the Chinese intelligence community pressuring companies to exfiltrate information about domestic users. In a recent case, Nokia android handsets were discovered to have a backdoor that sent a variety of data to a network server located in the network of China Telecom.29 Nokia had deliberately built this code into devices sold into China, but had then accidentally installed it onto all its other devices. In 2018, software from XIONGMAI, a Chinese camera vendor that manufactures security cameras, was found to have to an undocumented backdoor user named “tluafed” (“default” in reverse) that could access millions of cameras. This is believed to be related to a hash

  algorithm in the software development library provided by Huawei for its HiSilicon SOC, on which the camera is based.30

  30 “Millions of XIONGMAI Video Surveillance Devices Can Be Hacked Via Cloud Feature,” SEC Consult, accessed March 31, 2019, https://sec-consult.com/en/blog/2018/10/millions-of-xiongmai-video-surveillance-devices-can-be-hacked-via-cloud-feature-xmeye-p2p-cloud/.

  These and other incidents indicate that Chinese agencies may mandate backdoor access to devices shipped into China to aid their internal surveillance activities. Because of the nature of software development environments, it is difficult to maintain separate sets of code bases with some code options only compiled and installed on devices shipped to specific destinations. When those devices are shipped outside of China, those backdoors can still be used to exfiltrate information.

  We can only speculate whether or not the spread of these security vulnerabilities is intentional or inadvertent. However, if Chinese policy does require backdoor access embedded in devices sold in China for internal security purposes, this compromised code applied to such a large market increases the risk that these vulnerabilities will spill over into the rest of the world. If China dominates the market for 5G devices, both as a manufacturer and as a large and attractive market of users, then this potential for vulnerabilities will only continue to spread and put the larger 5G ecosystem at risk.

  CHAPTER 4: BOARD RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 5G

  Board Recommendations

  The Defense Innovation Board bases its recommendations on the assumption that mmWave fundamentally cannot be deployed on a large scale in the United States because of the propagation and cost limitations, and that sub-6 GHz mid-band spectrum (in the 3 and 4 GHz range) will become the global standard for broad area networks in coming years. This assumption is based on an assessment of the engineering requirements for mmWave and various studies projecting the required infrastructure and associated cost to support even a limited mmWave network. Additionally, the current financial state of U.S. providers may inhibit their ability to invest the required capex to support a mmWave network, limited or otherwise.

  Recommendation #1

  DoD needs to make a plan for sharing sub-6 GHz spectrum to shape the future 5G ecosystem, including an assessment of how much and which bandwidths need to be shared, within what timeframe, and how that sharing will impact DoD systems.

  ● DoD and the FCC must flip their prioritization from mmWave to sub-6 GHz spectrum for 5G. DoD and FCC have been prioritizing the 28 and 37 GHz bandwidths as options for 5G development, but this effort is misplaced. This study has covered the broad range of limitations associated with mmWave, and reasons why the rest of the world will adopt a sub-6 GHz 5G ecosystem. In light of this, DoD must prepare itself for that future operating environment by focusing on co-existing, if not explicitly sharing, with civil 5G operations in those bands of spectrum.

  ● DoD should particularly focus on the bands of the sub-6 GHz spectrum that are already being used by China. Chinese 5G systems and infrastructure operate in the 3.2-3.6 GHz range, as well as the 4.8-5.0 GHz range. As a result, the commercial world has developed semiconductors and handsets that are configured for that range, and DoD should angle for the most developed market to expedite 5G sub-6 GHz deployment in the United States. It takes approximately two years to add new frequency bands to complex multiband transceivers, and the United States would be able to avoid those two years of development by leveraging subcomponents and devices already on the market for more mature spectrum usage, such as existing Qualcomm products with functionality in the bands leveraged by China.

  ● As an additional consideration, DoD currently occupies ~500 MHz of space in the 4 GHz spectrum. DoD should take action to share parts of this space, given that it is a material amount of bandwidth that could make a serious impact on 5G development. 5G functions most optimally on large amounts of consecutive bandwidth, and this range could provide the real estate to drive 5G development forward.

  *For more detailed options around DoD spectrum sharing, see Classified Annex.

  ● For additional spectrum availability, DoD should recommend that the NTIA, FCC and Department of State should advocate the reallocation of the C-band satellite spectrum to IMT-2000 5G use at the World Radio Conference later this year (WRC-19), and take measures to adopt sharing in all 500 MHz of the band in the United States on an accelerated basis for fixed operations. While this will have limited impact on the U.S. 5G mobile ecosystem, sharing in this band could provide broad coverage at 100 Mbps and above for fixed broadband service to a large section of the rural United States.

  ● DoD should encourage other government agencies to incentivize industry to adopt a common 5G network for sub-6 deployment. Incentives can include: accelerated depreciation, tax incentives, low interest loans and government purchase of equipment and services.

  ● This recommendation does not call for the eviction of DoD systems operating in the sub-6 GHz spectrum, nor does it call for the sharing of ALL DoD spectrum. DoD must conduct thoughtful but candid analyses of the cost and schedule associated with sharing different spectrum bands, and prioritize accordingly.

  ● However, DoD must bear in mind that the status quo of spectrum allocation is unsustainable. 5G capability requires larger bands of spectrum, and without that additional bandwidth, the United States will not gain true 5G capability beyond the limited range that mmWave can provide. In the next year, DoD is in the position to enable or inhibit 5G adoption in the United States based on its use of sub-6 GHz spectrum.

  ● DoD stands to significantly benefit if it shares some of its sub-6 GHz spectrum. As the commercial sector develops and deploys 5G technologies and networks, DoD will be able to leverage commercial innovations to build its own new and improved technologies and networks. At a strategic level, 5G can create a step-change in situational awareness and decision-making by integrating more systems into a network that shares more data faster and at lower latency.

  ● This effort will require close coordination with NTIA to clear and reassign spectrum. Timing is critical - it is not enough to simply share spectrum, it must be done quickly to keep the United States competitive with China, South Korea, and Japan.

  ● Without aggressive action as outlined in this report, we believe there is a high likelihood that the United States will be unable to convince the rest of the world to adopt mmWave technologies as the standard 5G pathway. This may bifurcate the global market and result in the majority of the world adopting 5G sub-6 technologies, which will be dominated by the Chinese equipment and handset manufacturers.

  Recommendation #2

  DoD must prepare to operate in a “post-Western” wireless ecosystem. This plan should include R&D investments towards system security and resiliency on an engineering and strategic level.

  ● Sharing parts of the sub-6 spectrum will certainly help the U.S. 5G effort, but gaining a competitive edge over China would require action at a rate and magnitude previously unseen within DoD. For this reason, it is probable that most of the world outside of the United States will adopt a sub-6 5G solution, forcing DoD to operate on a “post-Western” wireless ecosystem. In this event, DoD should assume that all network infrastructure will ultimately become vulnerable to cyber-attack from both an encryption and resiliency standpoint.

  ● DoD must adopt a “zero-trust” network model. Perimeter defense models have been proven to be ineffective, and 5G will only exacerbate this problem as more systems are linked into a common network. Information access should no longer be granted simply through attachment to a specific network, and instead should be granted through various security checks within the network. DoD should also plan to move to quantum-resistant key exchange mechanisms to deal with the eventual fall of public key exchange algorithms, particularly given China’s investments in quantum computing.

  ● While “zero-trust” networks can protect context exchange through cryptography, these exchanges will still be subject to traffic analysis and detection of surges in network utilization. DoD should work to keep large amounts of data flowing on a constant basis so that increases in operational tempo will not be noticed.

  ● In addition to these security precautions, DoD must brace for cyber-attack and penetration by improving resiliency and building in layers of redundancy throughout its networks to ensure uninterrupted connectivity.

  ● DoD will need to consider options for defending against a compromised supply chain, where Chinese semiconductor components and chipsets are embedded across multiple systems. DoD should invest in R&D to study the impact of compartmentalizing systems to limit an attacker’s ability to move laterally into other systems. This will come with performance costs, and DoD must find the line where it can balance baseline capability with security.

  ● DoD should advocate for aggressive protection of U.S. technology intellectual property rights (IPR) in an effort to slow down China’s telecommunications ecosystem expansion. The United States should leverage export controls to slow the rate of market loss for Western vendors, even if it may increase the pace at which China becomes self-sufficient.

  ● DoD will increasingly be driven to operate on shared commercial networks without their own bespoke infrastructure (as in the case of nuclear C3). DoD must analyze the risks and benefits associated with that shift, and adjust its concept of operations to account for it.

  *For a more detailed assessment of 5G impact on nuclear C3, see Classified Annex.

  ● DoD needs to consider the broader implications of a compromised supply chain, such as risk to personal devices and information that can be derived from activity on those

  devices. If China is able to collect this data, DoD should consider discrete directives to defend against these vulnerabilities that fall outside the traditional DoD systems and platforms, such as training to limit inadvertent sharing of PII through personal device use.

  ● In addition to these efforts, DoD should initiate testing and experimentation on its bases for future generations of wireless technology beyond 5G. This testing and experimentation will occur over a longer timeframe to ensure that the United States is prepared to lead the next generational transition. These activities can include testing for sub-6 sharing, as well as future mmWave deployment and propagation improvement.

  Recommendation #3

  DoD should advocate for adjusted trade policies to discourage vulnerabilities in its supply chain on the grounds that they put national security assets and missions at risk.

  ● The compromised supply chain issue poses a serious threat to national security by introducing vulnerabilities into networks and systems, which can be leveraged by a hostile actor to disrupt DoD operations. The spread of these vulnerabilities creates an increasingly unstable environment by lowering barriers to offensive action while weakening defensive positions.

  ● The proliferation of security vulnerabilities creates incentives for all nations to take offensive action in a conflict, as the barrier to offense decreases while the difficulty of defense increases. This reality is reflected in the new U.S. Cyber doctrine of “forward defense”.

  ● To counter this threat, DoD should advocate that trade policy reward good security/coding and penalize vulnerabilities through tariffs (“monetization” of good development practices). For example, the United States could automatically impose a heavy tariff (say, 75%) on any goods from any nation found to have backdoors or serious security vulnerabilities. This would impose a market cost for insecurity, and would also create incentives for domestic companies to fund security researchers to find vulnerabilities in competitors’ products, thereby triggering the tariff. This would improve the overall security of DoD ecosystems without having to disclose vulnerabilities found by Title 50 entities.

  ● The United States should encourage Five Eyes and NATO partners to adopt the same tariffs, regardless of product country of origin. The United States stands to benefit the most in a trade conflict over security of devices.

  ● DoD should also encourage CFIUS to block transactions of companies with a history of selling products with documented backdoors and security vulnerabilities.

  ● Additionally, the United States should continue to encourage partner nations to secure their own supply chains and deny access to Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) selling 5G wares.

  *For more information on Chinese 5G strategy and current state, see Classified Annex.

  Recommendation #4

  See Classified Annex.


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